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INTRODUCTION
•
•

At 38.8 million,1 the U.S. Hispanic population is already
larger than the entire population of Canada.2
Univision concedes “that there is no company as dominant
in English-language media as Univision is in Spanish.”3

•

“[T]he Communications Act prohibits [the FCC] from
‘granting a monopoly in the field of broadcasting,’ and [it
is] directed instead to serve the ‘public interest’ by
‘assuring fair opportunity for open competition in the use
of broadcasting facilities.’”4
In reviewing media mergers, the Federal Communications
Commission (“FCC” or “Commission”) has long recognized the
dangers of media consolidation and its negative effects on
competition, localism and diversity. However, in approving
Univision’s request to combine its Spanish-language television
assets with Hispanic Broadcasting Corporation’s (“HBC”) radio
assets (“Univision merger”), it has permitted a Spanish-media
giant to form. Although the combined entity does not command a
monopoly in the broad national market, and affects only Spanishspeaking audiences, the new entity dominates the U.S. Spanishlanguage market, dwarfing all competitors.
This Note argues that the FCC failed in its regulatory duty to
serve the public interest by granting the merger. To properly
achieve the public interest goals of competition, localism and
diversity, the FCC should have considered language as a factor in
defining the media market affected by the Univision merger. A
1

Haya El Nasser, 39 Million Make Hispanics Largest U.S. Minority Group, USA
TODAY, June 19, 2003, at A1. The Census has used the term “Hispanic” to designate the
Spanish-speaking population in the United States, so I have chosen to do so as well.
Johnny Diaz, Latino? Hispanic? Which Is It? Spanish Speakers Are Divided and Often
Confused, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 25, 2004, at 1.
2
Entravision
Commun.
Corp.,
U.S.
Hispanic
Market,
at
http://www.entravision.com/template.cfm?page=hispanics (last visited Oct. 8, 2004).
3
Mireya Navarro, As Univision Looks to Buy Into Radio, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2003)
at C8.
4
2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, 18 F.C.C.R. 13620, ¶ 54, at 13637–38 (proposed
June 2, 2003) (citing U.S. v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192, 203 (1956)) [hereinafter
Biennial Review 2002].
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market definition based on language would have been consistent
with Commission precedent. Had the FCC acknowledged that
language plays a part in the diversification of voices in media
ownership, the merger decision would have been different. The
adverse consequences of the FCC’s failure will only become more
apparent as America’s Hispanic population grows. The FCC
cannot ignore that this population will be severely impacted by the
merger.
This Note has three parts. Part I.A provides a legal framework
for the FCC’s review of broadcast license transfers through the
broadcast ownership rules, which inform its assessment of media
mergers. Part I.B traces the evolution of the FCC’s foreignlanguage media regulation, including examples of cases in which
the FCC used language as a determinative factor in its decision.
Part I.C describes the current marketplace of Spanish-language
television and radio entities and how Spanish-language audiences
use these media outlets. Part II recounts how the FCC and the
Department of Justice reviewed the Univision merger. Despite the
Justice Department’s finding that Spanish-language radio does not
compete with English-language radio, the FCC proceeded with a
market definition excluding language. Part III demonstrates that
the FCC’s approval of the Univision merger did not advance the
public interest in competition, localism and diversity. This Note
concludes that Spanish-language media is a discrete media market,
a distinction that federal regulation should fully recognize.
I. FEDERAL REGULATION OF MEDIA
Part I will detail the FCC’s methods for reviewing media
mergers and the unique history of foreign-language media
regulation. Part I.A will illustrate the scope of the FCC’s authority
to regulate media mergers through the broadcast ownership rules
and will define the statutory mandate that mergers benefit the
public interest. “The public interest” is a term of art that has long
been the governing principle of FCC regulation, despite its opaque
meaning. Since mergers often implicate antitrust laws, Part I.A
will also detail the parallel competition reviews carried out by the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. Part I.B
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will demonstrate the use of language as a determinative factor in
prior FCC decisions. Part I.C will show how Spanish-language
media is used in America today and which corporate players define
the broadcast arena.
A. How the FCC Reviews Media Mergers
The FCC reviews media mergers by the authority granted to
oversee broadcast licenses in the Communications Act of 1934.5
When applying for a license, a broadcaster must meet “citizenship,
character, and financial, technical and other qualifications . . . to
operate the station.”6 Even if the license applicant meets the basic
criteria, the FCC must determine whether the applicant meets
certain qualitative standards and if granting the license “would best
serve the public interest.”7 Since broadcast licenses are limited in
supply, mergers are accomplished by broadcast properties
changing hands through license transfers.8
If a television
broadcaster attempted to merge with a radio broadcaster, the FCC
would focus its review on the transfer of licenses between the
parties.
License transfers are permissible only when the
Commission finds that the “public interest, convenience, and
necessity will be served” by this action.9 Since the responsibility
to serve the public interest is the crux of the FCC’s duty in
broadcast licensing (and therefore media mergers), it is critical to
understand how the public interest has been defined by courts.

5

KENNETH CREECH, ELECTRONIC MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 130, 135 (4th ed.
2003) (noting the process and requirements under the Communications Act of 1934 for
how to obtain a broadcast license and the FCC’s jurisdiction over sales of licenses).
6
47 U.S.C. § 308(b) (2004).
7
DONALD E. LIVELY, ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNICATIONS LAW 151 (1992).
8
CREECH, supra note 5, at 130 (stating that sales of broadcast licenses for existing
facilities are more common).
9
47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (2004). In general, license transfers are governed by the same
standard as new applications or license renewals, but there are additional considerations
that the FCC will review in transfers alone. LIVELY, supra note 7, at 173. The FCC has
regulations for the frequency of transfers, requiring the broadcaster to hold the license for
a specific waiting period before transferring ownership to another. Id.
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1. The Public Interest
What constitutes “the public interest” has long been
debated10—a battle complicated by shifting meanings of the phrase
in different contexts and at different times in history. However, the
FCC’s ability to regulate in “the public interest” in broadcast
licensing was first given power and import in the 1943 case, NBC
v. United States.11 NBC argued that the FCC’s regulatory authority
was limited only to “technical and engineering” matters and that
the FCC did not have the authority to implement competitionbased, broadcasting regulations over the national radio networks.12
The Supreme Court held that the FCC was more than “a kind of
traffic officer, policing the wave lengths to prevent stations from
interfering with each other.”13
In the Court’s view, the
Commission “was given a comprehensive mandate to ‘encourage
the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest.’”14
This case confirmed that the Commission had broad,
congressionally-authorized power to regulate the broadcast
spectrum.15
Since NBC, the FCC has focused its broadcast regulation on
three areas it determined to be central to the public interest:
diversity, competition, and localism.16 Since media regulation

10
See 3 HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAW § 14.1, at 115–
17 (West Prac. ed. 1999 & Supp. 2003) (noting that the public interest standard adopted
into the Communications Act was “borrowed” from the Transportation Act of 1920
relating to railroad regulation and since that time has been debated as to its meaning).
11
T. BARTON CARTER ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FIFTH ESTATE,
REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA 71 (5th ed. 1999).
12
Id. The FCC was concerned that national radio networks had too much control over
the industry and local programming, therefore the FCC created the chain broadcasting
rules to govern the relationship between the local affiliated radio stations and the radio
networks. Id. at 71, 666. The rules were in place until 1977 when it was determined that
with the amount of existing competition they were no longer necessary in radio. Id. at
668.
13
NBC v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190, 215–16 (1943).
14
Id. at 219 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 303(g)(i) (1943)).
15
Id. at 219 (suggesting that the Communications Act granted the Commission
expansive powers).
16
Press Release, FCC, FCC Sets Limits on Media Concentration (June 2, 2003),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public (last visited Oct. 8, 2004).
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seeks to “promote First Amendment interests of consumers”17 and
the First Amendment “rests on the assumption that the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public,”18
diversity can be achieved through rules that “encourage diversity
in the ownership of broadcast stations, which can in turn encourage
a diversity of viewpoints in the material presented over the
airwaves.”19 Diversity of viewpoints and sources “plac[es] into
many, rather than a few hands, the control of this powerful medium
of public communication.”20 Such diversification also augments
competition since it “prevent[s] undue concentration of economic
power.”21
Through the allotment of spectrum to local
communities, the FCC assured that “good broadcasting” would
develop all over the country such that New York and Chicago
stations would not dominate the media.22 Broadcasters would
fulfill this goal of localism by serving “the programming and
advertising needs of the local community.”23 The Court in NBC
stated that “[l]ocal program service is a vital part of community
life,”24 and today it remains a key goal upheld by courts, Congress

17
2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, 17 F.C.C.R. 18503, ¶ 30, at 18515 (proposed
Sept. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Biennial Review 2002 NPRM].
18
Rules and Policies Concerning Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in
Local Markets, 16 F.C.C.R. 19861, ¶ 5, at 19863 (proposed Nov. 8, 2001) (citing
Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission’s Rules Relating
to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, Report and
Order, 45 F.C.C. 1476, ¶ 3, at 1477 (1964) (quoting Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945))).
19
Biennial Review 2002 NPRM, supra note 17, ¶ 30, at 18515.
20
Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission Rules
Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, 22
F.C.C.2d 206, 310 (1970).
21
FCC v. NCCB, 436 U.S. 775, 780 (1978).
22
Biennial Review 2002, supra note 4, ¶ 74, at 13643.
23
Gregory Prindle, Note, No Competition: How Radio Consolidation Has Diminished
Diversity and Sacrificed Localism, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 279,
290 (2003) (describing the localism as expressed by the Court and Commission in the
NBC case). One of the concerns raised in the NBC case was that local broadcasting
could suffer if a high percentage of a station’s programming came from a national source.
Id.
24
Biennial Review 2002, supra note 4, ¶ 76 at 13644 (quoting NBC v. United States,
319 U.S. 190, 203 (1943)).
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and the Commission.25 As a result, the broadcast ownership rules
promulgated by the Commission, including those issued as
recently as 2003, remain premised on these central and historic
principles of competition, localism and diversity.26
2. Broadcast Ownership Rules
The FCC regulates broadcast ownership because “broadcasters
are essentially trustees of the public’s airwaves [and] government
is the guardian of the public’s interests.” 27 Ownership, therefore,
is central to broadcasters’ use of the “public’s airwaves” which the
FCC must oversee.28 From its earliest days, the FCC developed a
regulatory scheme for ownership according to its public interest
mandate (focused on competition, localism and diversity). It
established rules which defined specific limits to the number of
broadcast entities one can own on a national and local level29 to
maintain competition, localism and diversity in broadcast
ownership. As a corollary, the FCC can deny a license transfer if
the resultant merged entity would violate these ownership limits30
because the transfer would be contrary to the public interest.31
Although the initial broadcast ownership rules focused on discrete
media ownership (such as those embodied by the local television
multiple ownership, local radio ownership, national television
ownership, and dual television network rules),32 the FCC later
developed cross-ownership holding limits between radio, broadcast
television, cable television, and newspapers.33 With the passage of
25

Id. ¶¶ 73, 75, at 13643–44.
Id. ¶ 131, at 13677.
27
Krystilyn Corbett, The Rise Of Private Property Rights In The Broadcast Spectrum,
46 DUKE L.J. 611, 613 (1996).
28
Id.
29
3 ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 10, § 14.4, at 150 (discussing local
ownership/duopoly and national ownership limits).
30
See id. § 14.6 at 220 (noting that the FCC can control licensing through hearings
when licensees do not comply with FCC rules).
31
PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 7.5, at 624 (2d ed.
1999 & Supp. 2003).
32
FCC,
FCC’s
Review
of
Broadcast
Ownership
Rules,
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/reviewrules.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
33
3 ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 10, § 14.4, at 155–59. Cross-ownership raised many
of the same diversity issues that common ownership of broadcast stations raised. Id. at
26
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the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“Telecom Act”)34, Congress
began requiring the FCC to review these ownership limits
biennially to determine whether they remain necessary and in the
public interest.35 The FCC issued new broadcast ownership rules
in 2003 through the 2002 biennial review.36
The longtime goals of competition, diversity and localism were
upheld in the 2002 biennial review. The FCC recognized there
was still a need for competition review when license transfers
occurred.37 It decided to use audience share as a gauge of
competition in some circumstances, and in certain discrete markets
to use competition in advertising markets as the measurement
governing whether competition existed between companies.38
Either way, the FCC committed itself to assess the competitive
harm wrought on the public and not the merger’s effect on
broadcasters or advertisers.39 The FCC determined that viewpoint
diversity was still a critical goal40 and the best way to measure it
was through news and public affairs programming.41 Viewpoint
diversity included broadcast television, radio, cable and the
internet. Program diversity, including programming aimed at
“minority and ethnic groups,” was important to broadcast
ownership regulation, but the FCC argued that this would best be
achieved by competition between media outlets rather than through
156. When the cross-ownership rules were put in place, “[ninety-four] television stations
were owned in common with daily newspapers serving the same broadcast community,”
which the FCC did not believe represented diversity of voices. Id. at 155–56.
34
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, §502, 110 Stat. 133
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 561) (2004).
35
2 ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 10, § 9.3, at 347.
36
Biennial Review 2002, supra note 22.
The Commission reaffirmed their
commitment to competition, localism and diversity in the 2002 biennial review. Id. ¶ 5, at
13623. The rules however were initially stayed by court action. Prometheus Radio
Project v. FCC, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 18390, at **3–4 (3d Cir. 2003). Since then, they
have been remanded in part to the Commission. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373
F.3d 372, 382 (3d Cir. 2004). Congress has since amended the Telecom Act to provide
for quadrennial review of the ownership rules. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 118 Stat. 3, 100 (2004).
37
Biennial Review 2002, supra note 4, ¶ 56 at 13368.
38
Id. ¶ 64, at 13641.
39
Id. ¶ 65, at 13641.
40
Id. ¶ 27, at 13630.
41
Id. ¶ 32, at 13631.
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government regulation.42 Localism remained an important goal
and would be measured by “selection of programming responsive
to local needs and interests, and local news quality and quantity.”43
However before the new rules could go into effect, they were
challenged in court and the Third Circuit ordered a stay of
judgment.44 Several consumer advocacy groups and broadcaster
associations petitioned for judicial review of the new rules.45 In
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, the Third Circuit agreed that
the rules promulgated under the 2002 biennial review were
problematic.46
The rules were in part remanded to the
47
Commission and the stay of judgment remains in effect until the
court reviews the FCC’s action on remand.48 As a result, the new
rules have not yet gone into effect and the Third Circuit
undermined many of the new policy arguments espoused by the
FCC in the 2002 biennial review.
3. Competition and Antitrust
Even though the rules are in flux, the Commission’s public
interest review still involves competition matters which also
implicates antitrust laws. Consequently, there is some overlap
between the FCC’s authority in this regard and those of other
executive and independent agencies, which hold more general
oversight in antitrust matters. Sometimes a merger that is
permissible under antitrust laws may not be permissible when the
FCC considers the public interest.49 Multiple agency review of
42

Id. ¶ 36, at 13631.
Id. ¶ 78, at 13644.
44
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 18390, at **3–4 (3d Cir.
2003).
45
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 381–82 (3d Cir. 2004).
46
Id. at 397.
47
The remand was premised on the grounds that the Commission made “an unjustified
assumption that media outlets of same type make an equal contribution to diversity and
competition in local markets” and “its decision to count the Internet as a source of
viewpoint diversity, while discounting cable, was not rational.” Id. at 435, 405.
48
Id. at 435.
49
Cavanagh, infra note 53, at 71 (noting that traditionally the FCC broadcast
ownership rules were more restrictive in radio than antitrust but with the relaxing of radio
rules in the Telecom Act, antitrust does again play an important role); see also James
Rowley & Katherine Reynolds Lewis, NBC Clears FTC Antitrust Hurdle to Buy
43
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media mergers is often necessary and even advantageous as the
Supreme Court recently noted that FCC regulation can work in
tandem with antitrust enforcement to benefit overall competition.50
Since FCC regulations establish a baseline for competition in a
market, broadcasters would not bother to attempt a merger and
seek antitrust review when they are in violation of FCC ownership
regulations.
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) or the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) will review mergers through their antitrust
and competition mandates, respectively,51 but their reviews are
limited. DOJ merger reviews focus only on economic factors52
including “market concentration, market conditions, the acquiring
firm’s entry advantage, market share of the acquired firm, and
efficiencies.”53 The DOJ is “‘required to approve mergers unless
they substantially lessen competition.’”54 The FTC can take noneconomic factors into consideration and “act[ing] as a ‘court of
equity’ . . . disapprove a merger based on public policy grounds.”55
However, antitrust agencies will only review large media
Telemundo TV: Network Still Must Obtain FCC Approval for Purchase of the SpanishLanguage Broadcaster, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2001, § 3, at 11.
50
Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 124 S. Ct. 872, 881
(2004).
51
CREECH, supra note 5, at 376. In 2002, the FTC and DOJ planned to establish clear
guidelines for reviewing mergers, but abandoned the effort when Congress expressed
opposition. ROBERT PITOFSKY ET AL., TRADE REGULATION 84–85 (Found. Press 2003).
52
Mike Harrington, Note, A-B-C, See You Real Soon: Broadcast Media Mergers and
Ensuring a “Diversity of Voices,” 38 B.C. L. REV. 497, 539 (1997).
53
Sarah Elizabeth Leeper, The Game of Radiopoly: An Antitrust Perspective of
Consolidation in the Radio Industry, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 473, 478 (2000) (noting the
economic factors the DOJ Horizontal Merger Guidelines address). The DOJ uses the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which requires defining the “relevant product and
geographic markets” at issue, to govern its analysis of radio mergers. Edward D.
Cavanagh, Symposium: Are New Media Really Replacing Old Media? Broadcast Media
Deregulation and the Internet: Deregulation of the Air Waves: Is Antitrust Enough?, 17
ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 67, 72 (2003). Once the markets are defined, the DOJ
seeks to determine the likely competitive effects of the merger. Id. at 72. With radio
mergers, the DOJ concentrates its inquiry into whether the proposed merger will “lead to
increased prices for radio advertising.” See also Part II.A. But see text accompanying
note 246 (noting relevant product market for Univision merger was Spanish-language
radio advertising).
54
HUBER ET AL., supra note 31, at 603 (quoting Worldcom, 13 F.C.C.R. 18025, ¶ 14, at
18034–35 (1998)).
55
Harrington, supra note 52, at 539.
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mergers.56 Therefore some license transfers may not receive any
antitrust scrutiny at all.57 Regardless of the merger’s size, the FCC
will ensure the license transfer meets the goals of diversity,
localism and competition.58 One court expressed its concern that if
license transfers were left to antitrust agencies alone, eighty-five
percent of media mergers since 2000 would not have been
reviewed by anyone.59 But since the FCC makes a public interest
inquiry these smaller (but no less critical) mergers were
examined.60
Since the FCC is concerned with the merger being in the public
interest and thereby promoting competition and diversity,61 it will
take into consideration antitrust principles in its competitive
analysis “but it is not governed by the scope of the antitrust
laws.”62 The FCC’s review process is also open and subject to
public examination. The FCC must present a well-reasoned public
record of its decision63 and must also respond to petitions to deny,
filed by members of the public, that raise “specific allegations of
fact sufficient to show that . . . a grant of the application would be
prima facie inconsistent with [the public interest].”64 As a result,
the FCC must approach each license transfer taking into
consideration public suggestions and comments.

56
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 414 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the
DOJ and FTC require notice of a merger only if “the transaction exceeds $200 million or
if the assets of one party exceed $10 million and the assets of the other party exceed $100
million”).
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Leeper, supra note 53 at 477.
62
HUBER ET AL., supra note 31, at 624 (quoting Teleport/AT&T, 13 F.C.C.R. at 15,
243-15, 244 ¶ 12 (citing FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc. 346 U.S. 86, 94 (1953);
United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 81–82, 88 (1980))).
63
HUBER ET AL., supra note 31, at 145–46 n.91. The DOJ and FTC can operate their
investigations “largely hidden from the public view” and their decisions do not require
substantive explanation. Id
64
Telemundo Communications Group, 17 F.C.C.R. 6958, ¶ 7, 6962 (2002) (quoting
Citizens for Jazz on WRVR, Inc. v. FCC, 775 F.2d 392, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing 47
U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) (1982))).
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B. Foreign-Language Media Regulation
From the earliest days of the Federal Radio Commission, the
predecessor agency to the FCC, foreign-language media has drawn
the attention of government regulators.65 Part I.B will demonstrate
that throughout the Commission’s history foreign-language media
has been treated differently from English-language due to unique
language-driven concerns. This part will show that the FCC has
often used language as a factor in making its decisions, whether the
rulings involve the program format of a radio station, approval of
media mergers, or the granting of special privileges to Spanishlanguage broadcasters. The FCC’s record proves that language has
been used as a determinative tool to ensure that broadcasters serve
the public interest.
1. Community Need as a Public Interest Priority
The FCC has charged broadcasters with the mission to serve
their local communities, a goal broadcasters have leveraged to
provide foreign-language programming to local foreign-language
audiences.66 The Commission has in turn recognized language as a
factor that can determine a community’s need for foreign-language
broadcasting.67
The FCC noted that in a 1931 decision called the Brooklyn
Cases68 the Radio Commission had approved of the meritorious
practice of “the broadcast of foreign language programs where
they were designed to educate and instruct the foreign populace
among its listening public in the principles and ideals of our
Government and American institutions.”69 Early on, the FCC
accepted that the “specialized nature” of foreign-language
programming could serve the public interest if “(a) a need for such
65

Michael E. Lewyn, When is Time Brokerage A Transfer of Control? The FCC’s
Regulation of Local Marketing Agreements and the Need for Rulemaking, 6 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 9–10 (1995) (noting that “brokered foreign language
programs were common in large markets before the 1934 Communications Act”).
66
See generally Part I.B.1.
67
See generally Part I.B.1.
68
U.S. Broad. Corp. (WARD), 2 F.C.C. 208 n.1 (1936) [hereinafter Brooklyn Cases I].
The dispute involved four radio stations in Brooklyn, NY in 1932. Id. at 213.
69
Id. at 223 (citing application of WJKS).
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service was shown to exist, and (b) the programming proposed was
designed for the purpose of meeting the unfulfilled need.”70 What
constituted suitable foreign-language programming in the public
interest was based on several factors:
[First, what] percentage of the population to be served . . .
can be expected to comprehend the foreign tongue[;
second, what] percentage of the station’s total programming
[will] be devoted to foreign languages[; third the control
the licensee] exert[s] over the content of the foreignlanguage programs[; fourth,] the number of other radio and
television services available in the area.71
The FCC used this formula in the seminal 1965 La Fiesta
proceeding when faced with a choice between two proposed
Spanish-language stations in a Texas community.72 A pair of
broadcasters were vying for a license in Lubbock, Texas: La Fiesta
proposed a full-time Spanish-language broadcast service, whereas
Mid-Cities proposed a part-time Spanish-language service.73 To
determine community need, the FCC looked to census statistics on
the Spanish-surnamed population in the area.74 The FCC also took
testimony from people in “public health, welfare, education,
religion and government” who worked closely with the local
Latino population.75 From these local experts, the Commission
determined that “English language broadcasts on matters relating
to civic affairs, voting and news [were] less effective than
programs broadcast in Spanish” for this community.76 No other
radio stations served the Spanish-language community at the
time.77 Mid-Cities had proposed religious, agricultural and black

70

Earnest & Flache, 6 F.C.C.2d. 65, ¶ 5, 67 (1965).
Great Lakes Television Inc., 25 F.C.C. 470, ¶ 54, at 526 (1958).
72
Earnest & Flache, 6 F.C.C.2d. 65, ¶¶ 1–2, at 65–66 (1965). Two mutually-exclusive
applicants sought to build a radio station in Lubbock, TX and the FCC conducted a
comparative hearing to determine which proposed service would best serve the public
interest, necessity and convenience. Id. ¶ 1, at 65.
73
Id. ¶ 1, at 65.
74
Id. ¶ 7, at 69.
75
Id. ¶ 8, at 68–69.
76
Id. ¶ 8, at 69.
77
Id. ¶ 10, at 70.
71
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programming with the part-time Spanish programming.78 While
there appeared to be a need for additional programming towards
the black community, the Commission found sufficient alternative
offerings for religious programming and no critical need for
agricultural programming.79 In the end, the FCC favored the fulltime programming for the Spanish-language community since the
language barrier otherwise deprived them of accessing any
broadcast programming in the area.80 Thus, the full-time Spanish
programming would “better serve the public interest.”81 This FCC
decision demonstrated that foreign-language programming could
be found in the public interest where there was community need.
Though the FCC created a formula to weigh community need,
it lacked “a guiding statement of general policy” towards the
merits of foreign-language programming overall.82 The FCC had
made “local self-expression” and “service to minority groups”
public interest broadcasting priorities.83 The FCC claimed that
local foreign-language community need was inherent in its goal of
“service to minority groups,”84 but there existed no separate and
distinct policy to oversee foreign-language broadcasting.
2. Program Format Disputes
The FCC’s failure to establish a foreign-language broadcasting
policy created a tension between cases that dealt with community
need and cases where a broadcaster sought to change a format of a
television or radio station to foreign-language programming.
78

Id. ¶ 12, at 71.
Id. ¶¶ 13–15, at 72.
80
Id. ¶15, at 72.
81
Id. ¶ 25, at 77.
82
Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 5 F.C.C.2d 71, 72 (1966) (concurring statement of
Commissioner Johnson).
83
Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The “Public Interest” Standard: The
Search for the Holy Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605, 615 (1998) (describing the “major
elements usually necessary to meet the public interest”).
84
Licensee Responsibility to Exercise Adequate Control over Foreign Language
Programs, 39 F.C.C.2d. 1037, ¶ 7, 1039 (1973). The licensees also have an affirmative
duty to “ascertain the problems and needs of significant groups in their communities and
to provide programming responsive to those needs.” New Mexico Broad. Co., 87
F.C.C.2d. 213, § D, 269 (1981) (dissenting statement of Commissioner Joseph R. Fogarty
citing 1960 Policy Statement, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291 (1960)).
79
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Spanish-language radio and television have often been referred to
as merely an entertainment format, like talk radio or classical
music. The FCC has avoided regulation of entertainment formats
since the 1970’s, due to First Amendment concerns.85 In the late
1960’s and early 1970’s, the Commission was faced with a number
of cases that brought to the forefront a burgeoning dispute between
the listening habits of the public and government’s role in
regulating programming.86 The FCC did not want to oversee
format changes of its broadcasters because of “the difficulty of
objectively evaluating the strength of listener preferences, of
comparing the desire for diversity within a particular type of
programming to the desire for a broader range of program formats
and of assessing the financial feasibility of a unique format.”87 It
argued that the market was “far more flexible than governmental
regulation and responds more quickly to changing public tastes.”88
In response to these cases, the FCC established a policy89 to leave
entertainment format regulation to the market.90 The policy was
challenged in FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild in the Supreme
Court.91 The Supreme Court in deference to the Commission let
85

ERWIN G. KRASNOW ET AL., THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION, 145–69 (3rd
ed. St. Martin’s Press 1982) (detailing the history of the entertainment format debate at
the Commission and in the courts). In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Commission
was faced with cases that brought to the forefront a burgeoning dispute between the
listening habits of the public and government’s role in regulating programming. Id.; see,
e.g., Citizens Comm. to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d 926 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(radio format changed from progressive rock to a “middle of the road” format);
Lakewood Broad. Serv., Inc. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (radio format
changed from all news to country and western); Citizens Comm. v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (a radio station format change from a classical music station to a
blended program).
86
KRASNOW, supra note 85, at 145–69.
87
FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 590 (1981) (noting Dev. of Policy re:
Changes in the Entm’t Formats of Broad. Stations, 60 F.C.C.2d 858, 862–64 (Jul. 28,
1976)).
88
Id. at 590.
89
Dev. of Policy re: Changes in the Entm’t Formats of Broad. Stations, 60 F.C.C.2d
858 (Jul. 28, 1976).
90
The policy stated: “the marketplace is the best way to allocate entertainment formats
in radio, whether the hoped for result is expressed in First Amendment terms (i.e.,
promoting the greatest diversity of listening choices for the public) or in economic terms
(i.e., maximizing the welfare of consumers of radio programs).” Id. ¶ 16, at 863.
91
WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. at 588–91.
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the policy stand;92 however it cautioned the FCC that its
application was too broad suggesting that “the Commission should
be alert to the consequences of its policies and should stand ready
to alter its rule if necessary to serve the public interest more
fully.”93 The Supreme Court required that the FCC act and not just
defer to the market forces if the public interest is better served by
regulating an entertainment format dispute.
This debate over entertainment formats prevented a broadcaster
from offering a Spanish-language radio program in Arizona in
1971. KEVT, a Tucson-based, English-language radio station,
sought to expand and offer night-time Spanish-language
programming.94 The request involved a more powerful radio
signal which, in turn, required a waiver from the FCC to grant a
more powerful signal for the station.95 A night-time service waiver
is granted when a licensee promises first primary service96 to at
least 25% of the area or at least 25% of the population residing
therein.97 KEVT alleged that it could prove a substantial portion of
the population spoke Spanish and would be served by the new
service.98 In light of the FCC’s policy that Spanish-language radio
was only an entertainment format, the FCC was hesitant to grant
the waiver solely because of the “specialized nature of [the]
proposed programming.”99 However, when the D.C. Circuit
reviewed this waiver request, it found a dramatic distinction based
on the foreign-language aspect of the proposal, stating that “there
92

The Supreme Court found that “the Commission ha[d] not forsaken its obligation to
pursue the public interest [in this matter]. On the contrary, [the Commission] ha[d]
assessed the benefits and the harm likely to flow from Government review of
entertainment programming, and on balance ha[d] concluded that its statutory duties are
best fulfilled by not attempting to oversee format changes.” FCC v. WNCN Listeners
Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 595 (1981).
93
Id. at 603.
94
Tucson Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 452 F.2d 1380, 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
95
Id.
96
The “first primary service requirement was adopted . . . in recognition of the
principle that each new nighttime assignment inevitably degrades the service areas of
unlimited-time cochannel stations and precludes possible future cochannel nighttime
operations over a wide area.” Champaign Nat’l Bank, 22 F.C.C.2d 790, ¶4, 791 (Apr. 29,
1970).
97
Tucson Radio, Inc, 452 F.2d at 1381.
98
Id. at 1382.
99
Id. at 1382 n.1.
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is a crucial difference between failure to serve a group which
cannot understand the language broadcasted, and a failure to reach
a group which chooses not to listen because of program
content.”100 The court suggested that the circumstances at issue
with KEVT were “unique” and that interpreting the rule in favor of
KEVT would not result in a “flood of applications for licenses”
whereby a group could demand service because it could prove a
substantial portion of the listening audience would prefer to hear
particular content, say, classical music, and it was not being
served.101 The DC Circuit viewed the KEVT waiver request as
more than a format change, since language was a critical
determinative factor in audience access to the format. The FCC
conceded that “[i]f a substantial segment of the community thinks
and speaks in the Spanish language only, and cannot understand
the English language, the broadcast stations in that area must be
responsive to this fact.”102 The FCC agreed to consider foreignlanguage as a critical factor in future waivers of this service rule.103
Format changes are still left to market forces, however the FCC
demonstrated in the KEVT decision that “Spanish” was more than
merely a format and viewed foreign-language programming as
serving the community need.
3. Broadcast Ownership
Despite such a commitment to serving community need, the
FCC has denied that language is a factor it considers in ownership
decisions. However, this policy has been inconsistently applied.
In the 1995 Spanish Radio Network decision, the Commission
determined that language was neither a factor in ownership
100

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
102
Tucson Radio Inc., 35 F.C.C.2d. 584, ¶ 6, 585 (June 20, 1972). The FCC stated that:
[I]f a petitioner can show (i) that a substantial segment of the community
speaks exclusively a language other than English; (ii) a need exists for aural
broadcast service in that language; (iii) that none of the existing stations would
serve this need; and (iv) that the prospects for obtaining such service by resort
to existing Commission remedies are poor, the Commission would then
entertain a petition for waiver of its primary service rule.
Id. ¶ 6, at 585–86.
103
Id. ¶ 6, at 585–86.
101
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regulation nor a factor for defining the market for the radio transfer
application.104 The petitioners, a group from the Florida Cuban
community, argued that the transfer of ownership of a Miami radio
station to Heftel105 violated the local radio ownership rules106
because the definition of the market for purposes of the ownership
rule was “Spanish radio.”107 The petitioners contended that the
relevant market for public interest review could be defined by
language, because the ownership rules were supposed to extend
beyond regular antitrust concerns and focus on the diversity of
voices.108 The Commission disagreed with the petitioners:
“[A]lthough Spanish speakers may be perceived by those seeking
to reach them as a distinct market, the multiple ownership rules are
not geared toward such a market definition.”109 According to the
FCC, the multiple ownership rules use the term “market” as the
equivalent of audience share.110 The Commission argued that
radio markets, as defined by Arbitron,111 are not distinguished
based on language.112 The FCC did not flatly refuse a potential rereading of the rules, but said that to derive a different definition
would require a rulemaking to “change its current multiple
ownership rules and policies.”113 The FCC appeared receptive to
the concept of language as a factor in ownership decisions,
however it was unable to do so in this license transfer decision
104

Spanish Radio Network, 10 F.C.C.R. 9954, ¶ 7, 9955 (1995).
Heftel was a pre-cursor entity of Univision’s merger target, Hispanic Broadcasting
Corporation. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
106
Spanish Radio Network, 10 F.C.C.R. 9954, ¶ 2, 9954 (1995).
107
Id. ¶ 4, at 9955.
108
Id. ¶ 5, at 9955.
109
Id. ¶ 8, at 9956.
110
Id.
111
“Arbitron Inc. . . . is an international media and marketing research firm serving
radio broadcasters, cable companies, advertisers, advertising agencies and outdoor
advertising companies. . . . Arbitron’s core businesses are measuring network and local
market radio audiences across the United States.” Arbitron, About Arbitron, at
http://www.arbitron.com/home/content.stm (last viewed Oct. 9, 2004).
112
Spanish Radio Network, 10 F.C.C.R. 9954, ¶ 8, 9956 (1995). Nielsen, which
calculates television audience share (market), takes into consideration language for
Hispanic-American ratings. Nielsen Media Research, Hispanic-American Television
Audience, at http://www.nielsenmedia.com/ethnicmeasure/hispanic-american/indexHisp.html (last viewed Oct. 9, 2004) (“Language usage in these homes has an important
impact on TV viewing choices.”).
113
Spanish Radio Network, 10 F.C.C.R. 9954, ¶ 9, 9956 (1995).
105
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because the FCC required a rulemaking to change existing
broadcast ownership regulations.114
The FCC found that language significantly affected market
advertising and competition, (critical components of the broadcast
ownership review), even if it did not go so far as to directly include
language in the market definition of the NBC/Telemundo
merger.115 Had the merger been approved outright, NBC would
have owned three stations in the Los Angeles market in violation
of the television duopoly rule,116 which only permitted a company
to own two stations in the same market if the market was
sufficiently diverse.117 NBC requested a twelve month window so
it could divest itself of one of its Los Angeles stations and comply
with the rule.118 It argued that temporary ownership of three
stations in Los Angeles was not a threat to competition and
diversity in that market since “the NBC and Telemundo stations
serve distinct audiences and do not compete directly for
advertising dollars.”119 A comparable situation arose several years
before in the Los Angeles market when Disney merged with
ABC.120 In that case, the FCC required divestiture of the offending
station within six months because Disney would have controlled
25% of the market’s total advertising revenue.121
However, the Commission conceded that NBC needed twice as
much time to divest the television station as ABC did in the same
exact market, due to the Spanish-language character of the
television stations at issue. First, Telemundo’s Spanish-language
stations generated significantly less advertising money than the
114
Id. ¶ 9; see also 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 137 (2004) (distinguishing
between administrative agency actions of adjudication and rulemaking).
115
Telemundo Commun. Group, Inc., 17 F.C.C.R. 6958 (2002).
116
Id. ¶ 1, at 6960–61.
117
Id. ¶ 1, at 6961 n.1 (citing to 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b) which read: “The television
duopoly rule provides that a single entity may own two stations in the same television
market (Nielsen DMA) if, following the acquisition, there would remain at least eight
independently owned and operated television stations and at least one of the stations is
not ranked in the top 4 in the market based upon the most recent all-day audience
share.”).
118
Id. ¶ 1, at 6960–61.
119
Id. ¶ 42, at 6974.
120
Id. ¶ 52, at 6978.
121
Id.
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Disney stations122 and would have been harder to sell in a six
month period.123 Second, the Commission found that the Spanishlanguage stations “d[id] not compete directly with” the NBC
English-language station since the three stations at issue, each had
“distinct programming and a different audience.”124 Therefore
common ownership was less onerous than the ABC/Disney
situation.125 The FCC allowed NBC the extra time to comply
based on the “Spanish-language character of the station” and its
economic conditions.126 Without resorting to a public rulemaking,
as had been suggested in Spanish Radio Network, the FCC used
language to assess competition and advertising when it approved
the Telemundo/NBC merger.
4. Network Representation Rule
Despite the FCC’s avoidance of language as a market
definition for broadcast ownership decisions, it has vigorously and
exclusively protected Spanish-language broadcasters by granting
them permanent waivers to the network representation rule which
governs the advertising relationship between national broadcast
networks and their local affiliates.127 By doing so the FCC has
acknowledged that Spanish-language media faces different
marketplace challenges and conditions than English-language
media.
The network representation rule was created in the 1950s128
and prohibits affiliates “from being represented by their network in
the non-network (spot) advertising sales market.”129
Spot
advertising refers to the time slots “purchased on a market-to-

122

Id. ¶ 52, at 6978–79.
Id. ¶ 51, at 6978.
124
Id. ¶ 48, at 6977. The two Telemundo stations had different sets of Spanish-language
programming and the NBC station operated in English. Id.
125
Id. ¶ 52, at 6978–79.
126
Id. ¶ 52, at 6979.
127
See infra text accompanying notes 128–56.
128
Network Representation of TV Stations in National Spot Sales; Request of Spanish
National Network, NPRM, 47 C.F.R. Part 73, 45895, ¶ 6, 45896–97 (Oct. 4, 1978).
129
S’holders of Hispanic Broad. Corp., 2003 FCC LEXIS 5106, ¶ 50, *59 n.98
[hereinafter Univision License Transfer].
123
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market basis rather than through a network.”130 Spot advertising is
an area the FCC wanted to leave in the control of the affiliates—
and the independent advertising reps they hired—because the FCC
believed that “network involvement in national spot representation
of affiliates ‘involves interference with the licensee’s independent
duty to operate his station in the public interest.’”131 This is
because affiliates would not be able to maintain their independence
if the networks controlled the advertising firms who were setting
the advertising rates in the spot sales market.132 The FCC did not
want networks to own the advertising representation firms (“rep
firms”) that could potentially favor the networks in rate setting
decisions by the stations.133 In 1978, Spanish International
Network (“SIN”)134 sought a waiver from the network
representation rule,135 arguing that competition concerns behind
the rule did not apply in the Spanish-language market.136 The rule
was supposed to maintain competition between national rep firms.
However, unlike the English-language market where there were
many national rep firms to sell non-network advertising, there was
only one other rep firm selling Spanish-language advertising.137
SIN argued that it if were subject to the rule, it would not be able
to afford to create separate national spot and network sales
advertising organizations.138
The FCC, however, was concerned that SIN’s relationship with
its affiliates would be just as detrimental as any other major
network acting as the rep firm for its affiliates.139 The FCC
130

University of Texas, Department of Advertising, Quick Index (defining “spot
television” (or “spot radio”)), at http://advertising.utexas.edu/research/terms/#S (last
viewed Oct. 27 2004).
131
Network Representation of TV Stations in National Spot Sales, supra note 128, ¶7, at
45897.
132
Id ¶ 7, at 45897.
133
Id.
134
SIN is the predecessor entity to Univision. Univision, Company Overview: History,
at http://www.univision.net/corp/en/history.jsp (last visited Oct. 9, 2004).
135
Network Representation of TV Stations in National Spot Sales, supra note 128, ¶ 1,
at 45896.
136
Id. ¶ 8, at 45897.
137
Id. ¶ 10, at 45897.
138
Id. ¶ 8, at 45897.
139
Id. ¶ 11, at 45897.
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recognized that SIN had a “high degree of control” over the
stations it served and “to the extent the Spanish-speaking
population forms a distinct audience or ‘market,’” granting a
waiver in this area [might] increase that “concentration of
control.”140 In the end, the FCC considered the economic
consequences at the time. SIN’s total spot revenue for its twelve
stations was $9.6 million, compared to the $2.6 billion in revenue
produced by the “Big Three” (NBC, ABC, and CBS).141 The
national networks enjoyed greater economic success than
“‘fledgling’ entities” such as SIN and its affiliates,142 so the FCC
granted a temporary waiver of the network representation rule,
thereby allowing SIN to be the only television broadcaster to make
national spot advertising sales for its own affiliates.143 The FCC
issued a rulemaking and allowed SIN to serve as national
advertising representative to its affiliates until Oct. 1, 1979, or 60
days after the final decision, whichever was later.144 This waiver
was not reviewed until 1990 and SIN had the un-checked benefit
of the waiver for 11 years.
Although the Commission still had not resolved the matter in
1984, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) reviewed the six-yearold waiver during a hearing on alien control of several Spanishlanguage stations.145 SIN had argued that the waiver was
necessary because SIN’s programming hours would be limited and
sales would be at most $10 million a year.146 But the judge noted
that in the six years that SIN benefited from the exclusive waiver,
it acquired 300 cable and broadcast affiliates, operated twenty-four
hours a day, and controlled “approximately $98 million of the $118
million dollars spent in 1984 on Spanish television advertising.”147
The ALJ questioned whether the waiver prevented competing spot

140

Id. ¶ 12, at 45898.
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.¶ 17, at 45898.
144
Id.
145
Spanish Int’l Communications Corp., 1986 FCC LEXIS 4175, ¶ 1, at *2 (1986)
[hereinafter Seven Hills ALJ Decision].
146
Id. ¶ 186, at *114.
147
Id. ¶ 186, at **114–15.
141
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sales representatives from entering the market,148 and whether
lifting the waiver would potentially increase competition and
relieve broadcasters from having to deal exclusively with SIN.149
The ALJ concluded that the extension of the waiver to SIN was not
in the public interest.150
However, the Commission did not consider the matter until it
issued a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in 1988, to
reopen the inquiry into the necessity of the waiver.151 The
temporary waiver of the network representation rule was extended
until 1990,152 when the FCC concluded that a permanent waiver
should be issued to SIN/Univision.153 The permanent waiver was
granted to all Spanish-language networks entering the market
including Telemundo (1990),154 and Azteca America (2003).155
The FCC stated that it was in the public interest to “encourage[e]
the growth and development of new networks; foste[r] foreignlanguage programming; increase[e] programming diversity;
strengthe[n] competition among stations; and foste[r] a competitive
UHF service.”156
Despite evidence of SIN’s increased
concentration of control over its affiliates and the potential harm it
would engender, the FCC extended the waiver of the rule
permanently to all Spanish-language broadcasters entering the
market on the theory that the marketplace conditions are unique
and distinct for Spanish-language media, thus demonstrating the

148

Id. ¶ 187, at *117.
Id. ¶ 190, at *118.
150
Id. ¶ 191, at *119.
151
Amend. of § 73.658(i) of the Comm’n’s Rules, Concerning Network Rep. of TV
Stations in Nat’l Spot Sales; Request of Spanish Int’l Network (SIN) for Waiver of §
73.658(i), 3 F.C.C.R. 2746 , ¶¶ 1–2, 2746 (May 12, 1988).
152
Id. ¶ 2, at 2746.
153
Amend. of § 73.658(i) of the Comm’n’s Rules, Concerning Network Rep. of TV
Stations in Nat’l Spot Sales; Request of Spanish Int’l Network (SIN) for Waiver of §
73.658(i), Request of Telemundo Group, Inc. for Waiver of § 73.658(i); Request of Latin
Int’l Network Corp. for Waiver of § 73.658(i), 5 F.C.C.R. 7280, ¶ 1, 7280 (Dec. 3, 1990).
SIN had changed its name in the interim years to Univision. Id.
154
Id.
155
Azteca Int’l Corp.; Petition for Waiver of § 73.658(i) of the Comm’n’s Rules, 18
F.C.C.R. 10662, ¶ 5, 10663 (May 23, 2003).
156
Id. ¶ 3, at 10663 (quoting Report and Order for permanent waivers for Univision and
Telemundo).
149
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FCC’s readiness to use language as determinative factor of
competition inquiries.
5. Cable Television
Although the FCC has rejected language as a factor in
broadcast television and radio, the Commission has regulated
Spanish-language cable television carriage based on language to
promote programming diversity,157 thus demonstrating a concern
for foreign-language media in those limited circumstances. When
the FCC began adopting rules to govern cable carriage in the early
1970s, foreign-language stations were treated differently.158 They
were defined by the FCC as specialty stations,159 those not of
“general interest to the average viewer.”160 Specifically, the
Commission noted that “a program broadcast in a foreign language
is of little interest to any but those fluent in the language.”161 The
FCC determined that specialty channels would be protected in their
local markets because local cable operators were required to carry
local channels162 (“must carry” rules).163 Specialty stations would
also get the benefit of a Commission waiver so that distant cable
157

Spanish-language cable channels benefit from unique cable rules defined by
language. This note focuses on encouraging Spanish-language media regulation for
broadcast television under a market definition based on language which has not been
explicitly used before despite its prevalent use in cable. See generally Part I.B.5.
158
Letter from Philip L. Verveer et al., Attorneys for SBS, to Marlene H. Dortch, Aug.
6, 2003, at 8 (citing Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K of the Comm’n’s Rules &
Regulations Relative to Cmty. Antenna Television Sys., et seq., Cable Television Report
and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, ¶ 96, at 180–81 (Feb. 2, 1972)).
159
Amend. of Part 76, Subparts A & D of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations Relative
to Adding a New Definition for “Specialty Stations” & “Specialty Format Programming”
& Amending the Appropriate Signal Carriage Rules, 58 F.C.C.2d 442, ¶ 2, 442 (Feb. 26,
1976) (Educational stations were included in this definition as well.).
160
Id. ¶ 24, at 452. The FCC found that the average viewer would not approach news,
films or sporting events in Spanish and English equally. Id.
161
Id.
162
Amend. of Part 76, Subparts A & D of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations Relative
to Adding a New Definition for “Specialty Stations” & “Specialty Format Programming”
& Amending the Appropriate Signal Carriage Rules, 58 F.C.C.2d 442, ¶ 36, 457 (Feb.
26, 1976).
163
A commercial broadcast station is allowed to “assert mandatory carriage rights on
cable systems located within the station’s [DMA].” CoxCom, Inc., 17 F.C.C.R. 17192, ¶
2 (Sept. 16, 2002) (citing the must carry order); see also, FCC, About Us,
http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html (Consumer Guide Glossary) (last viewed Nov. 3, 2004).
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systems could pick up their carriage.164 The Commission
demonstrated a readiness to tailor regulation based on language in
cable carriage.
C. Spanish-Language Media Marketplace
Despite a long history of foreign-language media in America,
traditional outlets for Spanish-language media were “old-line
community newspapers, low-wattage AM radio stations and one
struggling television network.”165 Today the Spanish-language
media industry is one of the country’s fastest growing media
segments,
with
advertising
and
revenues
increasing
166
exponentially.
As the Spanish speaking population grows,167
Spanish-language media will increase in importance and
influence.168 Part I.C will define the landscape of the Spanishlanguage media market, outlining the leading companies in radio
and television and describing the statistical studies that illustrate
the ways in which the Spanish-language audience use Spanishlanguage media.
1. Radio
The dominant companies in Spanish-language radio are
Hispanic Broadcasting Corporation (now Univision Radio),
Entravision, and Spanish Broadcasting System. HBC was created
with the 1997 merger of Heftel Broadcasting Corp. and Tichenor
Media Systems.169 Heftel was renamed Hispanic Broadcasting in

164

Amend. of Part 76, Subparts A & D of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations Relative
to Adding a New Definition for “Specialty Stations” & “Specialty Format Programming”
& Amending the Appropriate Signal Carriage Rules, 58 F.C.C.2d 442, ¶ 2, 442 (Feb. 26,
1976).
165
Frank Ahearns & Krissah Williams, Spanish-Language Media Expand:
Broadcasters, Newspaper Pursue Fast-Growing Market, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2003, at
A1.
166
See id. (noting Spanish-language broadcasting is a fast growing market).
167
See El Nasser, supra note 1, at A1.
168
David Hinckley, Spanish Media Trend Extends to Infinity, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 6,
2004, at 140 (“This is a very important market for everyone in media.”).
169
HBC Overview: Timeline, at http://www.hispanicbroadcasting.com/overview_timeline.htm (last viewed Oct. 9, 2004).
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1999.170 HBC was referred to as the “largest Spanish language
radio broadcasting company in the United States”171 and before
HBC merged with Univision in 2003, HBC owned sixty-six radio
stations in fifteen of the top twenty Hispanic markets.172 It
controlled “51 percent of Spanish-language radio revenue in the
top 10 markets in 2002.”173
Entravision, founded in 1996, maintains holdings in radio,
television and outdoor advertising.174 Entravision television
stations “represent the largest television affiliate group of the topranked Univision network.”175 With fifty-six radio stations in the
top fifty Hispanic markets, Entravision is “one of the nation’s
largest Spanish-language radio broadcasters.”176 Entravision’s
radio division was HBC’s greatest competitor.177
Spanish Broadcasting System (“SBS”) is the “largest Hispaniccontrolled radio broadcasting company in the [U.S.].”178 Founded
in 1983, SBS operates “27 stations in seven of the top-ten U.S.
Hispanic market.”179 Viacom has taken a 15% stake in SBS
subject to the FCC’s approval.180

170

Id. HBC’s largest shareholder was Clear Channel Communications. Meg James &
Jeff Leeds, Regulators Face a Bilingual Conundrum; A Proposed Merger Poses a
Question: Are Spanish-Language Media Their Own Market?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2002,
§ 1, at 1.
171
Investor Relations: Company Overview, at http://www.hispanicbroadcasting.com/investor_overview.asp (last viewed Oct. 9, 2004).
172
Jordan Levin, Univision Sparks Heated Debate in Two Languages, MIAMI HERALD,
Jun. 22, 2003, http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/6137596.htm?lc (last visited Oct.
9, 2004).
173
Id. (according to “BIA,” a firm specializing in media financial-analysis).
174
Entravision, Overview, at http://www.entravision.com/template.cfm?page=about&subpage-=overview (last viewed Oct. 10, 2004).
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
See infra note 257 and accompanying text.
178
Corporate History, at http://www.spanishbroadcasting.com/corporatehistory.shtml
(last viewed Oct. 10, 2004). Raúl Alarcón, Jr. is the Chairman and CEO of SBS. Id. The
Alarcón family has been involved in Spanish-language broadcasting since the 1950’s. Id.
179
About Us, at http://www.spanishbroadcasting.com/aboutus.shtml (last viewed Oct.
10, 2004).
180
Press Release, Viacom Inc., Viacom and Spanish Broadcasting System Announce
Strategic Alliance (Oct. 5, 2004), http://www.viacom.com/press.tin?ixPressRelease=80454180 (last viewed Oct. 10, 2004).
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2. Television
The leading sources for Spanish-language broadcast television
are Univision and Telemundo. These companies are fiercely
competitive with each other181 and yet claim that they also compete
with mainstream English-language broadcasters.182
a) Leading Companies
Univision Communications Inc. (“Univision”) started out as
SIN in 1961.183 Before the merger with HBC, Univision owned
two television networks,184 a cable network, three record labels and
a popular Internet website.185 Through the merger, Univision grew
to sixty-eight radio stations.186 Newspapers commonly call
Univision the “king of Spanish-language TV.”187 Univision itself
says it’s the “premier Spanish-language media company in the
United States.”188 Univision Network is “not only the largest
Spanish-language network in the U.S., but also the fifth largest
network overall.”189 “More Hispanics watch the Univision
181

See Eduardo Porter, Univision Keeps a Short Leach on Its Stars, WALL ST. J., (July
25, 2003) at B1 (noting the ban Univision has on allowing its stars to appear on
Telemundo in any capacity).
182
Jube Shiver, FCC OK Seen for Univision Bid for Rival, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 2003, at
C1 (remarking that Univision has suggested it “must grow to compete effectively against
English-language media conglomerates.”).
183
Ahearns & Williams, supra note 165, at A1. SIN was created to act as a sales
representative for a Los Angeles TV station and several Mexican border stations. Seven
Hills ALJ Decision, supra note 145, ¶ 27, at *17. Originally Televisa, “the largest
producer and exporter of Spanish-language programming in the world,” had a 75-percent
ownership stake in SIN. Id. ¶¶ 32–33, at *19–20. “Univision” started out as a “sales
concept” which included a package of live Televisa programming that SIN and Televisa
offered to other licensees. Id. ¶¶ 54–55, at *31–32.
184
The two broadcast networks are Univision Network and Telefutura Network
(launched in 2002). History, at http://www.univision.net/corp/en/history.jsp (last viewed
Oct. 10, 2004).
185
Business Description, at http://www.univision.net/corp/en/business.jsp (last viewed
Oct. 10, 2004).
186
Id.
187
James & Leeds, supra note 170, at A1.
188
Press Release, Univision, Univision Completes Merger with Hispanic Broadcasting
(Sept. 22, 2003), http://www.univision.net/corp/en/pr/Los_Angeles_22092003-2.jsp (last
viewed Oct. 10, 2004).
189
Univision Network, at http://www.univision.net/corp/en/univision.jsp (last viewed
Oct. 10, 2004).
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Network in each ratings daypart (primetime, daytime etc. . .) than
each of ABC, CBS, NBC, FOX and Telemundo.”190 In the 2002–
2003 season, “49 of the top-50 Spanish-language shows. . . aired
on Univision.”191 It controls 80% of the Spanish-language TV
audience.192
The Univision Music Group, a subsidiary of
Univision Communications, controls “about 35% of the Latin
music market.”193 Univision.com is also the “No. 1 Spanishlanguage website for U.S. Hispanics.”194
In 1987, decades after the advent of Univision, Telemundo
entered the market,195 and it has never truly rivaled the older
station in ratings.196 After a bankruptcy and several changes in
ownership,197 NBC acquired Telemundo in 2002 for $2 billion.198
Telemundo is now considered “the second-largest Spanishlanguage TV network in the U.S.”199 However, Telemundo has
often placed “a distant second in audience ratings to Univision.”200
Although Telemundo operates in 118 markets, reaching 91% of
Hispanic TV households,201 Telemundo has only approximately
20% of the viewing audience, with the other 80% captured by
Univision.202 Telemundo has been historically and derogatorily
190

Id.
Louis Chunovic, Spanish-Language TV Hits Stride at Upfront Market, TELEVISION
WEEK, May 26, 2003, at 16. The one “non-Univision series” was the Super Bowl. Id.
192
Shiver, supra note 182, at C1; Navarro, supra note 3, at C8.
193
Business Description, at http://www.univision.net/corp/en/business.jsp (last viewed
Oct. 10, 2004).
194
History, at http://www.univision.net/corp/en/history.jsp (last viewed Oct. 10, 2004).
The website gets “over 1 billion hits a year.” Marcelo Ballve,
The Battle For Latino Media, NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS, Jan.–Feb. 2004, at 20.
195
Michael White, Telemundo Spends on Novelas to Woo Viewers; NBC Pushes More
Original Programming, SUN-SENTINEL (FORT LAUDERDALE, FL), Oct. 26, 2003, at 15F.
196
Jordan infra note 203, at B1 (noting “Univision’s dominance has long rendered
Miami-based Telemundo a weak No 2.”).
197
Id.
198
James & Leeds, supra note 170, at A1.
199
Id.
200
Rowley & Lewis, supra note 49, § 3, at 11.
201
Corporate
Information,
at
http://www.telemundo.com/telemundo/2449824/detail.html (last viewed Oct. 10, 2004). Univision reaches 98 percent “of all U.S.
Hispanic television households.” Business Description, at http://www.univision.net/corp/en/business.jsp (last viewed Oct. 10, 2004).
202
Harry Berkowitz, Spanish-Language Telemundo Bought by NBC, NEWSDAY, Oct. 12,
2001, at A62.
191
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perceived as a “Caribbean network.”203 It has been suggested that
Telemundo does not connect with Hispanics of Mexican descent,
the core U.S. Hispanic target audience.204 Its primetime network
audience share of Hispanic 18–49 year-olds has increased from
17% to 23% in 2004, but as one analyst put it, it had “nowhere to
go but up.”205 Univision still has three times as many viewers as
Telemundo, a wider geographical reach, and a new radio platform
to cross-promote its programming.206 Even with the power of
NBC behind Telemundo, Univision continues to dominate the
television market.
b) Hispanic Audience Television Viewing Habits
Recent research shows that Spanish-language audiences have
different media habits than English-language audiences. There is a
demonstrated preference for news and entertainment programming
in Spanish, even if the viewers are bilingual and cable and internet
offerings are not as accessible. Second Audio Program (“SAP”)
has been an alternative tool in the television arsenal to reach
Spanish-language audiences.207 SAP allows television stations to
broadcast in English and at the same time offer a Spanish-language
simulcast.208 However, there has been some debate over whether

203

Miriam Jordan, Telemundo Network Takes on Univision with Help from NBC, WALL.
ST. J., Apr. 15, 2004, at B1 (chronicling the struggles Telemundo has faced in competing
with Univision and some of the steps NBC is taking to assist Telemundo). Due to
Univision’s deal with Televisa, a large investor in Univision and the “world’s largest
Hispanic broadcaster,” Univision has a lock on “a steady supply of Mexican telenovelas
[(soap operas)] and unbeatable prime-time ratings.” Id. Telemundo had sourced
programming from Columbia and Brazil but that type of programming did not catch on
with “viewers of Mexican descent.” Id.
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
Jordan, supra note 203, at B2.
207
“In 1985, the FCC allowed television stations to begin broadcasting stereo audio.
Not only did we get Stereo, but we also got an additional channel where we can broadcast
another audio program. This channel is called SAP for Second Audio Program.”
Milwaukee Public Television, SAP, http://mptv.org/mptvhome/tech/sap.html (last viewed
Nov. 4, 2004).
208
E.g., Jodi Bizar, Language Barrier; Simulcasts in Spanish of News Programs a
Debatable Strategy for Television Stations, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 15, 2002,
at 1B. SAP is available on all stereo-equipped TVs. Id.
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offering SAP simulcasts are worthwhile.209 For instance, ABC
launched a Spanish simulcast of World News Tonight with Peter
Jennings in 2000.210 Yet after one year the simulcast was
discontinued because it was not worth the annual $1 million cost to
maintain the service, as it did not make an appreciable difference
on Hispanic viewership.211 Since localism and diversity are
measured by local news programming,212 there is great concern
about whether SAP broadcasts of the local news advance the
public interest. Some parties have criticized the simulcasts as not
being a fair substitute for local news in Spanish.213 A recent study
by the Tomas Rivera Institute found that “Hispanics tend to prefer
news on Spanish stations, which offer more local and international
Latino news plus a smoother style.”214 Local news stations in large
Hispanic markets have stated, “English-language stations and the
Spanish-language stations appeal to different audiences.”215 News
stories translated into Spanish are still directed at Anglos and not
Latinos.216 In a study comparing Spanish-language local news
with English-language local news, it was found that they were
equal in quality (both were given Cs on average),217 but the subject
matter of coverage differed greatly.218

209

See id.; John M. Higgins, Spanish on SAP Just Hasn’t Caught on, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, Mar. 24, 2003, at 24.
210
Sandra Hernandez, ABC Rocks en Espanol, L.A. WEEKLY, Oct. 13–19, 2000,
http://www.laweekly.com/ink/00/47/offbeat.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
211
Bizar, supra note 208, at 1B; Higgins, supra note 209, at 24. Local broadcaster
WRAL in Raleigh, N.C. launched simultaneous translation of its local news and after two
years ended the program due to cost and lack of feedback. Higgins, supra note 209, at 24.
212
Biennial Review 2002, supra note 22, ¶ 78, at 13644.
213
Tatiana Pina, Channel 6 Offering Local News in Spanish, PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 26,
2001, at B03. One broadcast personality said, “It’s a nice effort but the Latino
community is really interested in hearing local news from their perspective. They like
local news and international news from their countries of origin.” Id.
214
Higgins, supra note 209, at 24.
215
Daisy Whitney, L.A. Stations Evolve to Serve Population Shifts, ELECTRONIC MEDIA,
July 24, 2000, at 13.
216
Higgins, supra note 209, at 24.
217
Quality was judged by topic range, focus, enterprise of stories, expertise, number of
sources, viewpoints and local relevance. Lauren Alexandre & Henrik Rehbinder,
Separate but Equal, Comparing Local News in English and Spanish, Special report:
Local TV News, On the Road to Irrelevance, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV./PROJECT FOR
EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, (Nov./Dec. 2002), at 99, available at
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A recent study showed that SAP has not been considered a
significant substitute for Spanish-language programming, since
only 42% of Hispanic households are cognizant of its existence
and only one in six study respondents used it with any
frequency.219 Univision itself has challenged the notion that
English-language SAP simulcasts are a worthy substitute for
Spanish-language programming, stating that cultural preferences
for Spanish-language programming are the reason behind
Univision’s dominance in the Hispanic ratings.220 Top-rated
English-language shows such as Friends and CSI rank 189 and
334, respectively, for Hispanic viewers.221 Even academics have
noted that “viewing patterns for Latinos(as) are . . . different from
those of whites.”222 Among bilingual Latinos, the choice of which
language they watch on television often depends on the format.223
http://www.journalism.org/resources/research/reports/localtv/2002/spanish.asp
(last
viewed Oct. 10, 2004).
218
Id. Thirty-four percent of the Spanish-language broadcasts portrayed police officers
as the likely antagonists, whereas twenty-six percent of English-language broadcasts
included crime stories. Id. at 100. Immigration stories were common in Spanishlanguage news, but practically non-existent in English-language news (less than half of
one percent of all stories). Id. Foreign affairs coverage in English-language news focused
on U.S. foreign policy whereas the focus of Spanish-language news was on Latin
America. Id.
219
Press Release, Tomas Rivera Policy Institute, Channel Surfing in English and
Spanish: New Study Reveals the Viewing Habits of the 16 Million Latino Adults Who
Watch TV Bilingually, May 21, 2003, at http://trpi.org/pages/nr03.html (noting study
Louis DeSipio, Latino Viewing Choices: Bilingual Television Viewers and the Language
Choices They Make, Tomas Rivera Policy Institute).
220
Chunovic, supra note 191, at 16.
221
Id.
222
Leonard M. Baynes, White Out: The Absence and Stereotyping of People of Color by
the Broadcast Networks in Prime Time Entertainment Programming, 45 ARIZ. L. REV.
293, 317 (2003). Unique content offered only on Spanish-language channels also could
drive viewers in the other direction. English-speaking audiences may begin to tune into
Spanish-language programs since Telemundo has begun to make its sexy telenovelas
(soap operas) available with English subtitles through closed captioning. Telenovelas
Translated, N.Y. POST, Apr. 22, 2004, at 91. World Cup soccer matches have often
driven English-language viewers to watch Spanish-language networks when they cannot
get the games anywhere else. James Ewinger, World Comes to Irish Haunt for Soccer
Cup, PLAIN DEALER (CLEV.), July 1, 2002, at B1 (noting that Brazilians watched the
World Cup on a Spanish channel at an Irish bar).
223
Press Release, Tomas Rivera Policy Institute, Channel Surfing in English and
Spanish: New Study Reveals the Viewing Habits of the 16 Million Latino Adults Who
Watch TV Bilingually, May 21, 2003, at http://trpi.org/pages/nr03.html.
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Most bilingual Latinos preferred news, soap operas, and variety
programming in Spanish.224 It is also important to note that
“[r]ecent studies have shown that U.S.-born Latinos tend to retain
the culture of their heritage more than other immigrant groups.”225
Even if they speak English well, 60% “of Hispanics prefer to
[speak] Spanish.”226 These statistics show that Spanish-language
audiences prefer their programming in Spanish—not just translated
into Spanish, but actually targeted for a Spanish-speaking
audience.
Despite the growth of Spanish-language offerings on cable,
cable has been viewed as an insufficient substitute for free
television,227 especially as a source for local programming.228
Local news has been the FCC’s indicator for localism and
viewpoint diversity in a local market229 and the FCC’s own studies
have shown that “local cable channels are the least watched of any
broadcast or cable stations.”230 Local cable channels operate in
limited markets. Local cable channels only reach 10–15% of cable
systems nationwide and of the twenty-two local cable news
channels available, five serve the New York City area.231 This
problem is exacerbated by cable’s reach to Hispanic households.
Cable penetration rates for Hispanic households are much lower
than in other American households,232 so even with a growing
number of Spanish-language programming choices available on
cable, access remains a problem.233 Nielsen has found that “[o]ut
224
225

B2.

Id.
Miriam Jordan, Hispanic Magazines Gain Ad Dollars, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 3, 2004, at

226
Id. It is important to recognize that as the Hispanic population grows and more media
outlets try to capture that audience, the methods used by different media outlets to
accomplish this task will become increasingly varied. Today, some magazines targeted at
Hispanics in America are offered in Spanish, some are in English, and some mix English
and Spanish for groups who live in both worlds. Id. Magazine publishers agree that
“[s]imply translating English articles into Spanish doesn’t work.” Id.
227
Baynes, supra note 222, at 326–27.
228
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 405 (3d Cir. 2004).
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Baynes, supra note 222, at 330; Allison Romano, Checking the Census,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 1, 2001, at 32.
233
Baynes, supra note 222, at 330.
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of 10.2 million total Hispanic TV homes, only 6.4 million receive
cable or satellite service.”234 With such a small percentage of
Hispanic homes receiving cable, and with little local programming
on cable, cable cannot be a sufficient substitute for the local news
service provided by broadcast television and radio.
Just as cable access lags behind in Hispanic homes, so does
internet access. The FCC has “acknowledged that almost 30% of
Americans do not have Internet access.”235 Internet access for
Hispanic households is behind that of non-Hispanic households
and “only about 3 percent of all content on the Web is in
Spanish.”236 The FCC’s own studies have demonstrated that the
Internet is not a significant source for local news programming,237
and like cable, is a weak substitute for broadcast television and
radio when considering localism and diversity concerns. These
statistics show that even if cable and the internet become viable
alternative sources to local broadcasting and newspapers (which
the Third Circuit court did not find was the case),238 they may,
nonetheless, be inaccessible to, or infrequently used by Spanishlanguage audiences at the same rate and in the same way.
It was in this media environment that the merger of Univision
and Hispanic Broadcasting Corporation was reviewed and
approved. Part II will lay out the issues that shaped the Univision
debate from the market definitions used by the DOJ and the FCC,
to the public comments and concerns that were raised when the
merger was proposed. Part III will show that the FCC’s decision to
approve the Univision merger was bad for localism, competition
and diversity. The FCC’s failure to define the market by language
was abandonment of its precedent and not in the public interest.

234

Romano, supra note 232, at 32. Digital cable penetration rates are also lower in the
Hispanic market. Id.
235
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 407 (3d. Cir. 2004).
236
Cara DiPasquale & Kris Karnopp, More Web Retailers Cater to Hispanics, CHI.
TRIB., June 12, 2003, at 35.
237
Prometheus Radio Project, 373 F.3d at 406.
238
Id. at 405–08.
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II. THE UNIVISION DEBATE
As the history of federal regulation of foreign-language media
demonstrates,239 the FCC has encouraged the dissemination of
foreign-language media to American audiences and has designed
regulation to protect and further its distribution. The arguments
raised in the merger have shaped the debate over foreign-language
media regulation for the future. Part II.A will explain the methods
and results of the DOJ antitrust review of the merger. Part II.B
will illustrate the public comments the FCC received which argued
for and against the Univision merger. Part II.C will describe the
FCC’s rationale in granting the license transfer in the Univision
merger. Part III will however demonstrate that the FCC failed in
granting the merger and its reasoning lacks credibility and support.
A. The Department of Justice Review of the Merger of Univision
and HBC
In 2002, Univision Communications sought to merge with
Hispanic Broadcasting Corporation240 through a $3 billion241 radio
license transfer application to the FCC.242 Due to the high costs
involved and media entities involved, the merger was subject to
review by the DOJ and FCC.243
The DOJ approved the merger under a conditional consent
decree.244 The DOJ claimed that the contemplated merger would
have violated antitrust law unless certain conditions were put into

239

See supra Part I.
Hispanic Broad. Corp., 17 F.C.C.R. 23717 (Nov. 22, 2002) (adopting Protective
Order).
241
Jeff Leeds, Clear Channel is Expanding in Spanish Radio, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,
2004, at C1.
242
Univision License Transfer, supra note 129, ¶ 1, at *1.
243
United States v. Univision Communications Inc., No. 1:03-CV-00758 (Mar. 26,
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f200800/200878.htm (Complaint for
Injunctive Relief; citing the Clayton Act for the authority of the DOJ to review the
merger) (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
244
United States v. Univision Communications Inc., No. 1:03-CV-00758 (Dec. 22,
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f202100/202184.htm (Final Judgment
Civil Action, hereinafter “DOJ Final Judgment”) (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
240
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place.245 To determine if a merger is compatible with antitrust law,
the agency will first define a product market, here, it was Spanishlanguage radio advertising246 and a geographic market, here, the
overlap markets of “Dallas, El Paso, Las Vegas, McAllenBrownsville-Harlingen, Phoenix and San Jose,”247 to determine if
the merger will increase concentration in those defined markets.248
The DOJ viewed this transaction as a merger of radio assets with
no impact on television, so it did not perform any analysis of the
pertinent television market. In its analysis of radio, the DOJ found
that the merger would “lessen competition”249 in the sale of
Spanish-language radio advertising and also increased prices in the
same market.250 The DOJ found the merger to be in violation of §
7 of the Clayton Act251 one of the principal antitrust statutes.252
To determine if there was market concentration in Spanishlanguage radio, the DOJ focused on Univision’s “significant and
long-standing relationship”253 with Entravision and Univision’s
potential control of Entravision radio assets.254 At the time of the
proposed merger, Univision had corporate governance rights, 30%
equity and a 7% voting stake in Entravision.255 If the merger were
245

United States v. Univision Communications Inc., No. 03-CV-0758 at 1–2 (May 7,
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f201000/201006.htm (Competitive
Impact Statement) (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
246
Id. at 5. The DOJ found that advertisers did not consider Spanish-language radio to
be a “reasonable substitute” for non-Spanish-language radio or any other media. Id.
247
Id. at 6.
248
Cavanagh, supra note 53, at 72 (demonstrating the DOJ application of the 1992
Horizontal Merger Guidelines to radio mergers).
249
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 12–27 (2004).
250
United States v. Univision Communications Inc., No. 1:03-CV-00758 (Mar. 26,
2003), (Complaint for Injunctive Relief) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f200800/200878.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
251
United States v. Univision Communications Inc., No. 03-CV-0758 (May 7, 2003),
(“Competitive Impact Statement”) [hereinafter “Univision Competitive Impact
Statement”]
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f201000/201006.htm (last
visited Oct. 10, 2004).
252
PITOFSKY supra note 51, at App. [1].
253
Univision Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 251.
254
United States v. Univision Communications Inc., No. 03-CV-0758 at 3 (May 7,
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f201000/201006.htm (Competitive
Impact Statement) (last visited Oct. 10, 2004). The broadcast affiliation agreement with
Univision lasts until 2021. Id.
255
Id.
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consummated without conditional divestiture, competition would
be reduced between HBC and Entravision.256
HBC and
Entravision were vigorous competitors in the Spanish-language
radio market for advertisers.257 There were few other competitors,
so the market was highly concentrated, with HBC and
Entravision’s “combined share of advertising revenue ranging from
70 to 95 percent” of the market in this merger.258 Univision’s
control and influence over both companies could therefore lessen
competition, increase prices, and reduce quality of service.259
Univision would not have the incentive to compete against
Entravision after the merger since Univision “will benefit even if a
customer chooses Entravision rather than HBC.”260 With no other
significant competitors in the market, advertising buyers would
have no choice but to ostensibly deal with Univision either through
HBC or Entravision.261
Since DOJ decisions are not subject to the public debate and
scrutiny of FCC decisions, the DOJ acted alone in proposing
conditions to lessen Univision’s ability to control Entravision and
preserve competition in Spanish-language radio advertising.262
Univision had to exchange all the common stock it held in
Entravision for a non-voting equity interest,263 so that Univision
would have neither voting nor director rights in Entravision.264
The Justice Department gave Univision three years to divest its
interest in Entravision.265 The goal was to ensure, initially, that
Univision had no more than 15% of “all outstanding shares of
Entravision,” and after six years, that Univision would own “no
more than ten percent of all outstanding shares on a fully converted
Univision would be subject to these divestiture
basis.”266

256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266

Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 9; see generally DOJ Final Judgment, supra note 244.
DOJ Final Judgment, supra note 244, at 4.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 4–5.
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requirements if it acquired any additional equity in Entravision
later on.267
Univision’s role in Entravision’s corporate governance was
also curtailed.268 Univision could not influence Entravision’s radio
business whether through its television relationship or by
communicating or receiving non-public information on
Entravision’s radio business.269 Despite these precautions, the DOJ
permitted Entravision to advertise on Univision radio and conduct
joint promotions with them.270 Univision could in turn advertise
on Entravision as well.271
Since the DOJ’s only concern was a lessening of competition,
once Univision’s relationship with Entravision was limited, the
merger was granted. It however still required the public interest
inquiry of the FCC.
B. Public Response to the FCC on the Proposed Merger
The Justice Department approved the merger in May of
2003.272
From August 2002273 until August 2003, public
comments were submitted to the Commission on the subject of the
Univision merger.274 Ultimately, the industry filings to the FCC
(by mainly Spanish Broadcasting System and Univision) shaped
both sides of the dispute regarding whether Spanish-language
media was a separate media market. Those against the merger
offered evidence of the use and operation of Spanish-language
media to demonstrate how it was a separate media market and
267

Id. at 5.
See id. at 6–8. Univision would not be permitted to elect officers, participate in
Board meetings, or “us[e] or attempt[] to use any ownership interest in Entravision to
exert any influence over Entravision in the conduct of Entravision’s radio business.” Id.
at 6–7. Univision could not prevent Entravision from changing their corporate
governance documents. Id. at 7.
269
Id.
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
See generally supra Part II.A.
273
Public Notice, Media Bureau Announces Assignment Of Docket No. To Proceeding
Involving Applications Filed By Hispanic Broadcasting Corporation And Univision
Communications, Inc. For Consent To Transfer Of Control Of Licenses And
Subsidiaries, 2002 FCC LEXIS 4071 (Rel. Aug. 16, 2002).
274
See infra Part II.B.1–2
268
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should be regulated as such. Those in favor of the merger argued
that Spanish-language media was part of the general media market
and an artificial market designation otherwise would be a separate
but equal standard.
1. Pro-Merger
Proponents of the merger argued that Spanish-language media
was part of the general media market, and consolidation between
these two market players would not be problematic because radio
listeners and TV viewers would still have a wealth of choices.275
In fact, consolidation between media players might benefit
audiences by increasing the chances that a merged media entity
would be able to better compete with traditional English-language
radio and television networks.276 These arguments were made with
an understanding that Spanish and English-language media were
substitutes, and therefore competitors.277 Proponents also focused
on the benefits that the merged company would generate.278 The
FCC received numerous letters from members of Congress who
supported the merger because it would “promote the growth of
Hispanic media”279 and lead to “the goal of better competition and

275

Letter from Scott R. Flick & Roy R. Russo, Counsel to Univision & HBC, to
Chairman Michael Powell, FCC, comment filed by Univision and HBC (May 14, 2003)
(Proceeding 02-235) (noting that “[t]here [a]re [n]umerous [s]panish-[l]angauge [m]edia
[s]ources [a]vailable to Hispanic [a]udiences”), at http://www.fcc.gov/transaction/univision-hbc.html (last viewed Oct. 11, 2004).
276
See Letter from Congressmen Henry Bonilla & Patrick Toomey to Chairman
Michael
Powell,
FCC
(June
6,
2003)
(Proceeding
02-235),
at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 11, 2004); Letter from
Sen. Orrin Hatch to Chairman Michael Powell, FCC (July 10, 2003) (Proceeding 02235), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 11, 2004);
Letter from Rep. Ciro Rodridguez to Chairman Michael Powell, FCC (Aug. 12, 2003)
(Proceeding 02-235), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited
Oct. 11, 2004).
277
See infra text accompanying note 294.
278
Neil Roland, FCC Likely to Approve Hispanic Media Merger, Despite Criticism,
HOUS. CHRON., June 22, 2003, at 3.
279
Letter from Rep. David Dreier to Chairman Michael Powell, FCC (June 6, 2003)
(Proceeding 02-235), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited
Oct. 11, 2004).
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stability.”280 Community groups contended that the merger would
“promote growth of Hispanic radio and television job[s],” capital
investments in Hispanic media would increase, and the combined
resources of Univision and HBC “w[ould] provide enhanced
services to the Hispanic community.”281
In its FCC filings, Univision made clear that it opposed an
arbitrary division of Spanish-language media from the general
media marketplace—a “separate but equal” standard.282 Univision
posited that this was a straightforward merger of a “television
company with a radio company”283 that “complie[d] with all
Commission rules.”284 Univision argued that there was “no factual
basis for artificially designating a separate Spanish-language
regulatory market.”285 Univision contended that competitiveness
and growth of the Hispanic media sector would not be served by
regulation that would “artificially retard its growth.”286 Univision
raised several FCC precedents where the FCC had found no
separate Spanish-language media market, and Univision reasoned
these decisions should not be overturned.287
Univision stated that there were no grounds to suggest
Hispanic audiences would “lack adequate listening and viewing
280
Letter from Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchinson to Chairman Michael Powell, FCC (June
25, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last
visited Oct. 11, 2004).
281
See, e.g., Letter from Eugenio Carrillo, Jr., President, Stanislaus County Hispanic
Chamber of Commerce, to Chairman Michael Powell, FCC (May 27, 2003) (Proceeding
02-235), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 11, 2004);
Letter from Estela Scarlatta, Co-Founder, Bilingual Foundation of the Arts, to Chairman
Michael Powell, FCC (received June 27, 2004) (Proceeding 02-235), at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 11, 2004). They
noted “Univision’s commitment to the Hispanic community” through jobs, scholarships
and sponsorships of youth groups. Letter from Steven A. Soto, Mexican American
Grocers Association, to Chairman Michael Powell, FCC (received June 5, 2003)
(Proceeding 02-235), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited
Oct. 11, 2004).
282
Letter from Scott R. Flick & Roy R. Russo (May 14, 2003), supra note 275.
283
Id.
284
Id.
285
Id.
286
Letter from Scott. R. Flick, Attorney for Univision, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary
of the FCC, Response to SBS Ex Parte Filings (July 23, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
287
Letter from Scott R. Flick & Roy R. Russo (May 14, 2003), supra note 275.
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options after the merger.”288 It contended that the argument
“Hispanics listen only to Spanish media is a fallacy.”289 Despite its
oft-cited ratings record,290 Univision offered up statistics showing
that Hispanics “listen to and watch a broad diversity of broadcast
sources,” including English-language broadcast television and
radio, independent Spanish-language television stations, broadcast
stations available from Mexico, Spanish-language newspapers, and
Spanish-language Internet offerings.291 Although it had publicly
argued the opposite292 to the FCC, Univision argued Spanishlanguage audiences use the SAP channel for viewing Englishlanguage networks.293 Univision had noted in several press reports
that it needed HBC to compete with the English-language
networks.294 Univision argued that this merger would add to the
diversity of choices in the market and not reduce the number of
Spanish radio stations available.295 Univision claimed that radio
station format changes from “English to Spanish [a]re
[c]ommon,”296 suggesting a functional substitutability between the
formats, and that the number of Spanish-language radio stations
was on the rise.297 Moreover, HBC and Univision had committed
themselves to build more “listening and viewing options” through
the conversion of new stations to Spanish format and not through
consolidation of existing stations.298
Univision opposed those competitors taking a position against
the merger. Univision criticized SBS, on procedural grounds, for
conducting its challenges to the merger through 2000 pages of ex

288

Id.
Id.
290
Chunovic, supra note 191, at 16.
291
Letter from Scott R. Flick & Roy R. Russo (May 14, 2003), supra note 275.
292
Chunovic, supra note 191, at 16.
293
Letter from Scott R. Flick & Roy R. Russo (May 14, 2003), supra note 275.
294
FCC Probably Will Approve Univision Purchase, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June
22, 2003) at E-8.
295
See infra note 298 and accompanying text.
296
Letter from Scott R. Flick & Roy R. Russo (May 14, 2003), supra note 275.
297
Id. HBC’s radio offerings targeted at Hispanic listeners are programmed in Spanish,
English and they are offered in bilingual formats as well. Id. Audiences and stations are
freely moving between both formats. Id.
298
Id.
289
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parte presentations, instead of filing a petition to deny.299 To file a
petition to deny, a party must raise “specific allegations of fact
sufficient to show that . . . a grant of the application would be
prima facie inconsistent with [the public interest].”300 There is a
high burden of proof on the petitioning party301 and “[g]eneral or
conclusory allegations or those based simply on belief are not
sufficient.”302 However, ex parte presentations “[are] not served
on the parties to the proceeding, or, if oral, [are] made without
advance notice to the parties and without opportunity for them to
be present.”303 Univision also attacked SBS for inconsistencies in
its filings304 and ignorance of the FCC case law305 in which the
FCC states that “it will not consider a stations’ programming
Univision
format in processing. . .transfer applications.”306
attacked Telemundo for many of the same things, labeling them as

299

Letter from Scott. R. Flick (July 23, 2003), supra note 286.
Telemundo Communications Group, 17 F.C.C.R. 6958, ¶ 7, 6962 (2002) (quoting
Citizens for Jazz on WRVR, Inc. v. FCC, 775 F.2d 392, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing 47
U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) (1982)).
301
Id. ¶ 7, at 6962 (describing the substantial process to succeed on a petition to deny
filing). “Under Section 309(d) of the Communications Act, there is a two-step test for
determining whether a petition to deny raises issues requiring that a transfer or
assignment application be designated for hearing. First, the petition to deny must set
forth ‘specific allegations of fact sufficient to show that . . . a grant of the application
would be prima facie inconsistent with [the public interest].’ Second, if the Commission
concludes, based upon the totality of the evidence, that there is a ‘substantial and material
question of fact’ concerning whether the grant of the application would serve the public
interest it must formally designate the application for a hearing in accordance with
Section 309(e) of the Communications Act.” Id.
302
Univision License Transfer, supra note 129, ¶ 53, at *62.
303
FCC, Ex Parte Fact Sheet, “What is an Ex Parte Presentation,”
http://www.fcc.gov/ogc/admain/ex_parte_factsheet.html (last viewed Nov. 4, 2004).
Though the FCC promulgates Ex Parte Rules to govern this procedure. See FCC, FCC’s
Ex Parte Rules at http://www.fcc.gov/ogc/xprte.html (last viewed Nov. 5, 2004).
304
Letter from Scott. R. Flick (July 23, 2003), supra note 286, at 4–5.
305
Id. at 8. Additionally, Univision claimed that SBS’s call for costly “case-by-case
review” was out of step with the Commission’s recent 2002 biennial review upholding a
bright-line test. See id. at 9. The SBS cited case law stating that “the [FCC] has sought to
encourage the growth of minority-oriented programming, including Spanish-language
programming, and have nothing to do with treating such programming as part of a
separate market for multiple ownership purposes.” Id. at 10.
306
Id. at 10.
300
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another “jilted suitor” of HBC.307 It challenged Telemundo’s
accusation that the merger would lead to a Univision monopoly of
viewpoints, asserting that the percentage of Univision’s audience
share of Hispanic viewing was completely wrong.308 Telemundo
claimed that Univision’s share was 70% of the Hispanic audience,
while Univision claimed its share was only 20%.309 It disagreed
with Telemundo’s claim that its thirteen-year exclusive content
deal with Televisa310 was not in the public interest311 and suggested
Telemundo’s failure to beat Univision in the ratings had little to do
with the Televisa programming, which accounts for only one-third
of Univision’s line-up.312 Univision, as the television market
leader, did not consider the claims raised by Telemundo, its oft
second-place competitor, to accurately reflect the issues raised by
the merger. Univision argued it was not a monopoly under the
FCC broadcast ownership rules and even with these additional
radio stations, it would still be in compliance with those languageneutral rules.
At the same time, Univision sought the continued protection of
its business from the network representation rule, which is
applicable only to Spanish-language broadcasters. Univision
vociferously protested any effort by the FCC to change the status
of the permanent waiver to national spot sales as a condition to the
merger with HBC.313 It threatened that any effort to remove this
waiver could lead to public harm and “the loss of local Spanishlanguage television programming and stations.”314 Furthermore,
there could be “disruption to investment in Spanish-formatted

307

Letter from Scott R. Flick & Roy L. Russo, Attorneys for Univision & HBC, to
Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary of the FCC (Aug. 27, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
308
Id.
309
Id.
310
Elisabeth Malkin, Mexico Media Mogul Follows the Money, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27,
2004, at W1 (“Univision has exclusive rights to Televisa’s programs until 2017.”).
311
Letter from Scott R. Flick & Roy L. Russo (Aug. 27, 2003), supra note 307.
312
Id.
313
Letter from Scott R. Flick, Attorney for Univision, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary
of the FCC (Sept. 8, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
314
Id.
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television operations.”315 In addition, Entravision, a third party to
the merger, would likely suffer the “greatest harm from its
elimination.”316 It could harm affiliates in the smallest markets
that are less likely to get national spot sales otherwise, and there is
“no ready substitute for Univision’s national sales representation
service . . . available to Entravision or other affiliates.”317 Thus,
Univision said that all of the public interest reasons on which the
waiver was premised still existed.318 More importantly, the
elimination of the waiver had “no conceivable connection to the
HBC merger.”319 Though Univision opposed the argument that
Spanish-language media was a separate media market, and it did
not want a separate-but-equal regulation regime to be installed, it
continued to seek unique protection from the national
representation rule which had been granted only to Spanishlanguage broadcasters.
Its advocacy continued to protect
Entravision, who operated the most Univision affiliates, since
Univision’s television interests continued to be intertwined with
Entravision’s, although the DOJ had curtailed its influence over
Entravision’s radio holdings.
2. Anti-Merger
Many opponents of the merger argued that Spanish-language
media is a separate media market, and if the FCC permitted
Univision to merge with HBC, consolidation by the leading TV
and radio entities would significantly reduce competition within
the Spanish-language media market.320 If one corporation were to
dominate all Spanish-language media, questions of programming,
source, and viewpoint diversity will be at issue.321 Members of the
public opposed the merger on the grounds that programming
diversity will be harmed and it would be harder for new entities,
315

Id.
Id.
317
Id.
318
Id.
319
Id.
320
Letter from Sen. Tom Daschle to Chairman Michael Powell, FCC (May 6, 2003)
(Proceeding 02-235), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited
Oct. 10, 2004).
321
Id.
316
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especially Hispanic ones, to enter the market.322 Public interest
groups and legislators were also concerned that the merger would
make future entry into the marketplace more difficult.323 Several
Senators urged the Commission to make a study of the Spanishlanguage media market before approving the Univision merger.324
The Congressional Hispanic Caucus asked the Commission to
“carefully review the full impact that this merger will have on the
Hispanic community.”325
Since review of the Univision merger coincided with the
biennial review of media ownership rules, concerns over media
322
A public letter-writing campaign contributed 5,553 letters from Hispanic-Americans
opposing the merger. See Letter from Arthur Belendiuk, Counsel for NHPI, to Marlene
H. Dortch, Secretary of the FCC (July 28, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 10, 2004); Letter from
Arthur Belendiuk, Counsel for NHPI, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary of the FCC (July
29, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last
visited Oct. 10, 2004) (The letters, in Spanish and English, spoke to the participant’s
concern that the Univision merger would “limit opportunities for Hispanic-Americans to
receive diverse news information and cultural programming,” “[would] damage [their]
culture,” “limit competition” and “make it more difficult for Hispanic-Americas to start
their own companies” in television and radio.). But see supra note 281 and accompanying
text (describing letters in favor of the merger).
323
See Letter from Sen. Edward Kennedy et al., infra note 324. The Media Access
Project (“MAP”), a public interest telecommunications law firm, made ex parte
presentations to draw the Commission’s attention to the barriers-to-entry problems in the
Spanish-language media market. Letter from Andrew Jay Schwartzman, President &
CEO, Media Access Project, to Chairman Michael Powell and Commissioners, FCC
(July
25,
2003)
(Proceeding
02-235),
at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
324
See Letter from Sen. Patrick Leahy & Sen. James Jeffords to Chairman Michael
Powell, FCC (May 20, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 10, 2004); Letter from Sen. Hillary Rodham
Clinton to Chairman Michael Powell, FCC (May 7, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 10, 2004); Letter from
Sen. Edward Kennedy et al. to Chairman Michael Powell, FCC (May 15, 2003)
(Proceeding 02-235), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited
Oct. 10, 2004); Letter from Sen. Patrick Leahy & Sen. James Jeffords to Chairman
Michael
Powell,
FCC
(May
20,
2003)
(Proceeding
02-235),
at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 10, 2004); Ballve,
supra note 194, at 20 (describing the Capitol Hill political debate that the Univision
merger generated).
325
Letter from Rep. Robert Menendez et al. to Chairman Michael Powell, Sept. 17,
2002, at 1, available at http://svartifoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6513307688.
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consolidation had become the subject of much debate in
Washington.326
Before the merger was approved, some
complained that the merger would create a “monolith that would
dominate Hispanic media and entertainment.”327 N.Y. State Sen.
Efrain Gonzalez Jr., the President of the National Hispanic Policy
Institute, likened Univision to Shamu and predicted “It [would]
eat[] all the little fish.”328 Additionally, with the combined assets
of Univision and HBC, Univision would have a “lock on twothirds of all Spanish-language advertising in the U.S.”329
Many of the filings made to the FCC by Spanish Broadcasting
System (“SBS”) argued that Spanish-language media is a separate
media market and attempted to prove that all parties in the industry
and even the FCC had acknowledged this fact in the past.330 SBS
argued that despite the FCC’s general belief that television and
radio do not compete with one another, the FCC needed to address
competitive connections in advertising between Spanish-language
television and Spanish-language radio.331
SBS contended that Spanish-language radio stations need to
advertise on Spanish-language television to be able to capture a
significant audience.332 If the merger were approved, SBS did not
want Univision to discriminate against other radio stations and
refuse to sell advertising to them, as competitors of HBC.333
SBS demonstrated this interconnectedness between Spanishlanguage radio and television by submitting Univision and HBC
marketing materials which each individually stressed that they

326

See Letter from Sen. Patrick Leahy & Sen. James Jeffords to Chairman Michael
Powell, FCC (May 20, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235) at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 10, 2004); see Ballve, supra note 194, at 20.
327
Ballve, supra note 194, at 20.
328
James & Leeds, supra note 170, at 1(quoting N.Y. State Sen. Efrain Gonzalez Jr.).
329
Id. at 1.
330
See supra text accompanying notes 340–46.
331
Letter from Philip L. Verveer & Bruce A. Eisen, Attorneys for SBS, to Marlene H.
Dortch, Secretary of the FCC (June 3, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
332
Id. SBS claimed that to launch several of its own radio stations, it needed to launch
numerous expensive advertising campaigns on Spanish-language television stations. Id.
333
Id. at 2.
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“compet[e] with each other for advertising revenue.”334 Here,
HBC and Univision took the perspective that, for advertising
purposes, Spanish language radio and television were
substitutable.335 SBS submitted a Lehman Brothers report which
stated that, from 1991 to 2002, Spanish language radio ad revenue
had lost ground in its competition with Spanish-language
television.336 SBS reasoned that the competitive reality of the
Spanish-language market was that Spanish-language radio and
television compete with one another.
SBS submitted statements from over twenty advertising
agencies and advertisers who all agreed that English-language
broadcasting and Spanish-language broadcasting constitute
separate markets.337 One advertising sales executive who had been
involved with Spanish-language media for forty-two years
acknowledged several situations where advertisements were pulled
because the buyer did not want to buy “Spanish radio” but radio or
A thirty-one year
“television not Spanish television.”338
advertising veteran noted that advertisers in the Spanish-language
334

Letter from Philip L. Verveer et al., Attorneys for SBS, to Marlene H. Dortch, (June
16, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at 6, available at http://svartifoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6514183066 (last visited Nov. 4,
2004).
335
Id.
336
Letter from Philip L. Verveer et al., Attorneys for SBS, to Marlene H. Dortch, (June
23, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at 2, available at http://svartifoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6514282032 (last visited Nov.
4, 2004).
337
Letter from Philip L. Verveer & Bruce A. Eisen (June 3, 2003), supra note 331.
Jeffrey H. Smulyan, Chairman and CEO of Emmis Communications Corp. stated that in
his twenty-five years of radio experience “English language and Spanish language radio
stations do not generally compete with each other” and advertising markets and budgets
are totally separate. Letter from Jeffrey H. Smulyan to Secretary Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary
of
the
FCC
(July
11,
2003)
(Proceeding
02-235),
at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 11, 2004). His radio
stations do not take into consideration the Spanish-language stations when setting their ad
rates. Id. See Letter from Philip L. Verveer et al., Attorneys for SBS, to Marlene H.
Dortch, Secretary of the FCC, Declaration of Alan Sokol (July 14, 2003) (Proceeding 02235), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
338
Letter from Philip L. Verveer & Bruce A. Eisen, Attorneys for SBS, to Marlene H.
Dortch (June 2, 2003), at 6–7 (referring to letter from Eduardo Caballero to Chairman
Michael Powell, May 27, 2003), available at http://svartifoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6514156470.
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market often substituted Spanish-language television and Spanishlanguage radio but did not shift advertising from English to
Spanish or Spanish to English just because of price changes.339
These advertising business customs reflect a marketplace where
Spanish-language radio is interchangeable with Spanish-language
television. This demonstrates a flexibility between radio and
television unseen in English-language media, because of the
unique variant of audience language.
SBS, submitted cases in which the FCC itself recognized the
“specialized status of Spanish and other minority languages”
therefore the designation of separate Spanish-language media
market would be in line with Commission precedent.340 SBS
argued that the idea that Spanish-language is merely a format was
undermined by thirty years of FCC decisions.341 The FCC had, on
several occasions, protected Spanish-language media by specific
regulations namely, the spot sales waiver,342 cable carriage
specialty signals, the must-carry rules, newspaper/broadcast
television cross-ownership rules343 and in two specific cases that
Univision cited in its filings, Spanish Radio Network and Brawley
Broadcasting.344 SBS argued that the Commission’s position in
Spanish Radio Network could be viewed as the multiple ownership
rules are based on evaluating market concentration and entry

339

Id. at 4–5 (referring to letter from Castor A. Fernandez to Chairman Michael Powell,
May 27, 2003).
340
See Letter from David M. Don, Counsel for SBS, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary of
the FCC, Ex Parte Presentation to Commissioner Copps (June 17, 2003) (Proceeding 02235), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
341
Letter from Michael G. Jones et al., Attorneys for SBS, to Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary
of the
FCC
(June
26,
2003)
(Proceeding
02-235), at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
342
See supra notes 127–56 and accompanying text.
343
Letter from David M. Don (June 17, 2003), supra note 340. The presentation cited
the case of Telemundo Communications Inc., 17 F.C.C.R. 6958 (2002); see supra notes
115–26 and accompanying text for more information on this opinion. They also noted
cable carriage history. See supra notes 157–64 and accompanying text.
344
Letter from Michael G. Jones et al. (June 26, 2003), supra note 341. SBS also noted
that in Brawley Broadcasting, 13 F.C.C.R. 21119 (1998), the FCC’s decision to waive the
one-to-a-market rule for Entravision was due in part to the anticipated creation of
improved Spanish-language programming options. Id.
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barriers in English language broadcasting only345 and they are not
designed to properly assess Spanish language media.346 SBS
argued that through the business practices of advertising, through
the language of the targeted audiences, and throughout FCC
precedent, Spanish-language media could be distinguished as a
separate media market and needed to be regulated as such.
Telemundo made ex parte presentations to the Commissioners
opposing the Univision merger on the grounds of its impact on
diversity and competition.347 Telemundo’s concerns focused on the
potential anticompetitive effects of the merger.348 Much like SBS,
it didn’t want to be denied access to advertising opportunities on
HBC radio stations because it had been denied access to
Entravision stations before.349
Telemundo sought merger
conditions that would protect competitive access to talent and radio
promotion and prohibit joint sales.350 Collectively, the parties
against the merger demonstrated that the merger was not in the
public interest and significant anticompetitive harms would arise
from it.351 Even though SBS was a competitor of HBC, it raised
evidence of FCC precedent to support its thesis that Spanishlanguage media existed as a separate and distinct market apart
from English-language media and the FCC itself had recognized
that before.352 The FCC reviewed the comments filed by SBS,
Univision, Telemundo, Congressmen, Senators, and the public at
large to conclude that the merger of Univision and HBC was in the
public interest.353

345

Letter from Philip L. Verveer et al., Attorneys for SBS, to Marlene H. Dortch (June
26, 2003), at 2, available at http://svartifoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6514282534.
346
Id.
347
Letter from F. William LeBeau, Counsel to Telemundo, to Marlene Dortch,
Secretary of the FCC, Ex Parte Presentation (Aug. 21, 2003) (Proceeding 02-235), at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
348
Id.
349
Id.
350
Id.
351
See supra notes 320–50 and accompanying text.
352
See supra notes 330–46 and accompanying text.
353
See infra notes 354–412 and accompanying text.
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C. Final FCC Review of the Merger of Univision and HBC
The FCC approached the merger as the Justice Department did,
under the perspective that it was simply a transfer of radio
assets,354 and it maintained its longtime stance that radio and
television advertising do not compete with each other.355
Therefore the only competitive review required was in the radio
market.356 The FCC looked to the broadcast ownership rules to
determine whether the license transfers would be permissible under
the competitive guidelines laid out in the rules.357 In the end, it
decided that Spanish-language media should not be considered a
separate media market for broadcast ownership purposes.
1. Broadcast Ownership Rules
Because the merger would result in a combination of Univision
television assets and HBC radio assets in overlap markets, the FCC
applied the radio-television cross-ownership rule358 and found that
the all the license transfers were permissible.359 Univision
complied in most areas with local radio ownership rule,360 but in
two markets, Houston and Albuquerque, Univision would own one
more station than was permitted.361 The FCC required divestiture
of the two stations within six months if the stay of judgment was
354

See supra text accompanying note 246 (stating that the relevant product market was
Spanish-language radio advertising).
355
The FCC has “generally assumed, in [their] competition analyses of radio
transactions, that radio and television stations do not compete in the same product
market, an approach the DOJ has generally followed.” Univision License Transfer, supra
note 129, ¶ 59, at *68.
356
Id.
357
Id. ¶¶ 7–11, at **8–16.
358
Id. ¶¶ 7–8, at **8–9. Note that the 2002 Biennial Review eliminated the radiotelevision cross-ownership rule. 3 ZUCKMAN, supra note 10, § 14.4, at 50. At this point
in the Commission’s review they are using the old rules. See 3 ZUCKMAN, supra note 10,
§ 14.4, at 47,49,51, 155–59 (West Prac. ed. 1999 & Supp. 2004) (describing the
newspaper-broadcast and broadcast-cable cross-ownership rule).
359
Univision License Transfer, supra note 129, ¶ 9, at *12.
360
The Commission noted in the Univision decision that it was applying the new 2002
biennial rules for the radio multiple ownership part of the Univision merger. Id. ¶ 11, at
**15–16. But it did not apply the new rules for the cross-ownership section of the
decision. See supra note 358.
361
Univision License Transfer, supra note 129, ¶ 11, at **15–16. Univision would
control six FM stations and one AM station. Id.
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lifted by the Third Circuit in the Prometheus Radio Project case or
the 2002 biennial rules went into effect.362
2. Attribution
Since the FCC must review the broadcaster’s ownership it will
determine what parties have an ownership stake in the entity. The
only owners that will be considered attributable for purposes of the
FCC ownership rules, however, are those that confer a “degree of
influence or control such that the holders [of such control] have a
realistic potential to affect the programming decisions of licensees
or other core operating functions.”363 The National Hispanic
Policy Institute (“NHPI”) filed a petition to deny against the
merger and focused mainly on the “relationships between Clear
Channel, HBC, Univision and Entravision”364 and their attributable
interests.365 NHPI was concerned about Clear Channel’s “26
percent nonvoting equity interest in HBC”366 and Univision’s
ownership of 9.86% of Entravision’s voting stock.367 NHPI was
troubled that separation of ownership between these companies
was an illusion and that Univision would continue to control
Entravision, while Clear Channel would exercise control over
HBC.368
The FCC reviewed the attributable control of
shareholders within Univision and HBC. Overall, the Commission
did not find a problem with Clear Channel’s ownership interest in
HBC.369 Though after the merger Clear Channel’s non-voting
362

Id. ¶ 11, at *16 (noting, however, that this decision was under the new ownership
rules that were under a stay of execution at the time they were applied). Yet one year
later, the new local television rule was partially remanded to the Commission by the
Third Circuit because the numerical limits set by the FCC were not well-reasoned or
supported. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 420 (3d Cir. 2004).
363
In the Matter of Review of the Commission’s Regulations Governing Attribution of
Broadcast and Cable/MDS Interests, 14 F.C.C.R. 12559, ¶ 1, 12560 (Aug. 6, 1999).
364
Univision License Transfer, supra note 129, ¶ 12, at *16.
365
Id. ¶ 12, at *16.
366
Id. ¶ 13, at *19.
367
Id. ¶ 37, at *44.
368
Id. ¶ 12, at *16.
369
Id. ¶¶ 28–29, at *35. Clear Channel’s interest in HBC had been previously reviewed
by the Commission, which found that the interest was not attributable. Id. ¶ 13, at *19.
However, Clear Channel itself has attracted attention from federal authorities because of
the immense growth of its radio holdings since the passage of the Telecom Act of 1996.
See Alicia Mundy, Score One for Regulators, CABLE WORLD, Jul. 28, 2003, at 3
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interest in HBC would be converted into a 3.66% voting stock
interest in Univision,370 any voting interest below 5% is considered
nonattributable under FCC rules.371
NHPI also raised ire over Clear Channel’s appointees on
HBC’s Board of Directors.372 However, the FCC determined that
the two appointees at issue had been independently elected to the
board,373 and that there was no evidence to support allegations that
it would influence the HBC Board on behalf of Clear Channel.374
NHPI argued that Clear Channel would have de facto control over
HBC and would exercise the same over Univision,375 but the FCC
found that NHPI’s petition to deny failed to raise a “substantial and
material question of fact.”376

(remarking that Clear Channel played a large role in the media consolidation debate,
especially in Congress, where it was viewed as “the poster child for Big Media Gone
Bad. Almost every member of Congress cited Clear Channel as the bete noir that spurred
their vote.”). Clear Channel, the industry leader in radio station ownership, owned thirtysix radio stations before the passage of the 1996 Act, and by 2003, 1225 stations. Jeff
Leeds, Clear Channel: An Empire Built on Deregulation, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2002, at
B1. The allegations NHPI made of anti-competitive behavior on the part of Clear
Channel in its dealings with SBS were dismissed by the FCC as conclusory and
unsupported. Univision License Transfer, supra note 129, ¶¶ 28–29, at *35.
370
Id. ¶ 14, at **20–21.
371
Id. Clear Channel would also comply with the FCC’s rule on Equity/Debt for
attribution. Here attribution can attach if an “investor either (1) supplies over 15% of a
station’s total weekly broadcast programming hours, or (2) is a same-market media entity
subject to the broadcast multiple ownership rules, its interest in the licensee or other
media entity in that market will be attributable if that interest, aggregating both debt and
equity, exceeds 33% of the total asset value of the licensee or media entity.” Id. at *21
(citing 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555, Note 2(a) (2003)). Clear Channel argued that its combined
debt and equity would not exceed 33% and NHPI did not proffer evidence to rebut this.
Id.
372
Id. ¶ 16, at *23. The Commission considers “an investor’s relationship to an entity’s
Board of Directors” when ascertaining the potential attribution of influence. Id.
373
Id. ¶ 18, at *24. “They work for financial institutions that provided banking services
for Clear Channel.” Id.
374
Id. ¶ 18, at *25.
375
Id. ¶ 19, at *25. This too was previously argued in Shareholders AMFM Inc. and
dismissed. Id. ¶ 19, at *26.
376
Id. ¶ 25, at **31–32. NHPI failed to explain how Clear Channel’s 3.66 percent
voting interest could be overcome by Univision’s single-majority shareholder, Jerrold
Perenchio. Id.
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Both NHPI and the FCC had initial concerns over Univision’s
governance and control of Entravision,377 but the DOJ addressed
many of these concerns in its Consent Decree.378 The FCC
concluded that compliance with the DOJ decree would cause all
relevant concerns as to Univision’s control of Entravision to be
moot.379 Even though the FCC attributed Entravision television to
Univision, Univision was still in compliance with the
radio/television cross-ownership rule.380 NHPI challenged the
Commission’s findings,381 but the FCC determined that
Univision’s interest in Entravision did not exceed 33% and
therefore complied with the FCC attribution standard.382
3. Monopoly
Beyond the petitions to deny proffered by NHPI, Elgin FM
Limited Partnership (“Elgin”) raised informal objections in the
Univision proceeding.383 Elgin owned three radio stations which
competed with HBC in Texas and was concerned that the merger
would create “a Spanish language media monopoly.”384 Elgin’s
fears were that Clear Channel’s dominant ownership of
entertainment venues, combined with Univision’s influence in
music entertainment, would prevent an unaffiliated company like
Elgin, from being involved with a music event or creating
synergies that could compete with “‘media giants’ Univision and
Clear Channel.”385 The Commission again did not find that Elgin
377

Id. ¶¶ 39, 43, at *45, **49–50 (revealing that the FCC staff requested further
information from Univision to determine attribution). NHPI argued that the rights
retained by Univision would not only be attributable, but would also give Univision de
facto control over Entravision. Id. ¶ 41, at *46.
378
Id. ¶ 40, at *46.
379
Id. ¶ 41, at *47.
380
Id. (noting that Univision also would comply with the new 2002 biennial crossmedia limits).
381
NHPI argued that because “Univision acts as Entravision’s exclusive national
advertising representative firm,” Univision’s continued influence should demand
attribution. Id. ¶ 49, at *58. However, the FCC no longer uses advertising representation
as a guideline for attribution. Id. ¶ 50, at *59. Instead, it uses the EDP standard to
consider attribution. Id. See supra note 371 (explaining the Equity Debt Plus standard).
382
Id. ¶ 47, at *56.
383
Id. ¶ 52, at *60.
384
Id. ¶ 52, at *60.
385
Id. ¶ 52, at *61.
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argued with the requisite specificity.386 Even in arguing that the
merger is anti-competitive, Elgin did not argue how “Univision
[would] be able to control Spanish language entertainment as a
whole” and how Elgin would be harmed.387
The FCC also dismissed the concerns over anti-competitive
behavior raised by Telemundo and the Media Access Project
(“MAP”).388 The MAP and Telemundo’s accusations involved
Univision’s policy that made it hard for “competitors to hire
Univision’s TV personalities or obtain marquee programming.”389
Newspaper reports suggested that Univision personalities were not
permitted to appear on Telemundo under any circumstances.390
There were allegations of Univision “preclud[ing Telemundo]
from promoting its programming on Entravision’s radio
stations.”391 However, the Commission was “not convinced that
the practices alleged by Telemundo and MAP, even if true,
[would] translate into competitive harms.”392
4. Separate Media Market
The FCC believed SBS was arguing for a Spanish-language
submarket and advocating for the FCC to review the effects of the
merger on Spanish-speaking audiences.393
Under those
circumstances, the FCC refused “to limit or condition [its]
approval of this transaction on the basis of [the] purported impact
on Spanish-speaking audiences.” 394 The FCC found that SBS did
not make a strong enough argument to overcome the
Commission’s longtime “reluctance to define product markets
based on programming format or language.”395 The Commission
386

Id. ¶ 53, at *61.
Id. ¶ 54, at *63.
388
Id. ¶ 54, at *64 n.107.
389
Id.
390
Porter, supra note 181, at B1.
391
Univision License Transfer, supra note 129, ¶ 54, at *64 n.107.
392
Id. ¶¶ 56–57, at **66–67.
393
Id. ¶ 57, at *67.
394
Id.
395
Id. ¶ 58, at *67; see Part I.B.2 ( discussing the history of format disputes and the
Commission’s current stance). But see Part I.B (demonstrating the Commission’s past
considerations of language in media regulation).
387
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also restated its longstanding belief that radio and television
stations do not compete in the same product market, which is also
consistent with the DOJ’s position.396 The FCC refuted evidence
of a separate Spanish-language media market as anecdotal and
unconvincing.397 Since Univision did not own any radio stations,
the merger with HBC would not create undue radio
concentration.398
If the Spanish-language media market was deemed separate, a
proper competitive analysis would include the other market
participants and the ease of entry into the market.399 The FCC
considered Telemundo a direct and worthy competitor of
Univision.400 With GE/NBC behind it, Telemundo would have the
finances, resources and expertise to compete in this market.401
Even if the FCC was concerned with competition in a separate
Spanish-language media market, Telemundo was sufficient
competition.
In determining diversity, the FCC examined all of the media
outlets that target Hispanics.402 The FCC argued that bilingual
viewers have more outlets and alternatives for viewpoints than the
rest of the population.403 Even looking only at Spanish-language
programming, there was not a “single gatekeeper” to diversity,
with the existence of local Spanish newspapers, Spanish radio,
Second Audio Program television broadcasting, and cable/satellite
options.404 The FCC contended that programming available to
Spanish-speaking audiences today is growing and substantial405
and expected that cable would provide many more Spanish outlets
in the future.406 The FCC found that barriers to entry in Spanishlanguage radio had been demonstrably low, as evinced by the
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406

Id. ¶ 59, at *68.
Id.
Id. ¶ 59, at *69.
Id. ¶ 60, at *70.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 62, at *73.
Id. ¶ 63, at *76 (based on statistics collected by the Tomas Rivera Policy Institute).
Id. ¶ 64, at *76.
Id. ¶ 60, at *70.
Id. ¶ 60, at *71.
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increased number of radio stations introduced in the Spanish
format between 2001 and 2002.407 The Commission’s study found
that 163 stations switched to the Spanish-language format.408 The
FCC viewed this as evidence that entry into the Spanish-language
radio market was not difficult at all: a radio station owner could
simply buy an English-language station and convert the format
from English to Spanish.
After consideration of evidence from both advocates and
detractors of the merger, the FCC approved the license transfer
finding it was in public interest and convenience.409 It found there
were no barriers to entry in the market,410 diversity would not be
undermined,411 and there would be no shortage of media outlets
available to Spanish speaking audiences.412 Univision, in one
single moment, became the leading Spanish-language television
company and radio company, and with that, one more market
player left the playing field. Part III recognizes that this moment
was a step in the wrong direction for the FCC, an abandonment of
the public interest, and ignorance of the fact that Spanish-language
audiences would seriously be affected by this change. Varied
ownership leads to viewpoint diversity. The FCC consistently
repeats this mantra, however Spanish-language ownership is less
varied today and viewpoint diversity is even more shallow.
III. WHY THE UNIVISION MERGER WAS A FAILURE IN THE PUBLIC
INTEREST
The FCC’s approval of the Univision merger was not in the
public interest. The FCC did not take into consideration
competition, localism and diversity for the audience affected by the
merger—the Spanish-speaking audience. All FCC decisions must
be well-reasoned and Part III will show that the FCC’s reasoning in
the Univision merger was flawed and implausible. The FCC did
407
408
409
410
411
412

Id. ¶ 61, at *72.
Id.
Id. ¶ 67, at *79.
Id. ¶ 65, at *78.
Id. ¶ 67, at *79.
Id. ¶ 65, at *78.
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not properly consider the arguments presented to them by the
Department of Justice, academic scholars, market participants or
the consuming public. It even contradicted its own history.
Spanish-language media forms a unique and distinct market and
the FCC blatantly chose to ignore this evidence.
A. Language as a Factor of Analysis
The FCC could have looked to its earlier holdings and
recognized that language plays a vital role in regulatory decisions.
Despite the FCC claims that it does not use language as a factor for
ownership analysis, it has used this standard on numerous
occasions.
1. Diversity and Competition
The FCC has stated that “[t]hose whose primary language is
not English deserve the same protections of diversity and
competition as do English speakers”413 and in the 2002 biennial
review, the FCC announced its intention to focus on the effects of
competition on the public,414 since its “duty as an agency runs to
consumers.”415 The FCC failed, however, to apply these two
policies, in tandem, to the Univision merger. Spanish-speaking
consumers were not the focus of the FCC’s competition analysis.
In the Univision merger, all consumers were included in the FCC’s
evaluation because it improperly defined the merger’s market
based on a language-neutral audience.416 But a broadcaster’s
audience, and how it is targeted, is based on language when the
broadcast language is Spanish. The FCC has acknowledged that
Spanish broadcasting only attracts and interests those who speak
the language.417 The Commission has said that “a program
broadcast in a foreign language is of little interest to any but those
fluent, in the language.”418 Audience reach cannot be calculated as
language-neutral if the audience attracted is only those fluent and
413
414
415
416
417
418

Biennial Review 2002, supra note 4, ¶ 458, at 13800.
Id. ¶ 56, at 13638.
Id. ¶ 68, at 13641.
See supra text accompanying note 394.
See supra text accompanying notes 160–61.
See Amend. of pt. 76, supra note 162, ¶ 24, at 452.
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interested in the language—the Spanish-speaking audience. It is
not an accurate measure of an audience if you count the many
Americans who do not speak Spanish in the measure of
Univision’s audience reach. Univision is not targeting those
consumers who don’t speak Spanish, so the FCC should not
include them in their analysis of the merger. In fact, the FCC
refused to find out if there was an impact on Spanish-speaking
audiences.419 The Congressional Hispanic Caucus asked the
Commission to “carefully review the full impact that this merger
will have on the Hispanic community,”420 but the FCC refused.421
The FCC cannot execute competition and diversity inquiries for
English-language audiences alone and still claim the merger is in
the public interest.422 The FCC cannot continue to exclude
language from broadcast ownership decisions if diversity and
competition are to be accurately measured for all audiences,
including Spanish-speaking ones.
The FCC has recognized how different the competitive market
is for Spanish-language broadcasters.423 That concern fueled the
special privileges the FCC granted to NBC in 2002 when NBC
merged with Telemundo.424 When ABC merged with Disney, the
FCC forced ABC to divest its extra TV station in six months
because of concerns over competition and excess control of
advertising in the L.A. market.425 But when NBC faced the same
problem, in the same market, it was given twice the time to divest
because of the Spanish-language stations involved in its’ merger.426
Excess concentration and control were not Commission concerns
because there was no competition between the NBC and
Telemundo stations due to the different language of the
broadcasts.427 It is contradictory to find that NBC would not
419

See supra text accompanying note 394.
Letter from Rep. Robert Menendez et al., to Chairman Michael Powell, Sept. 17,
2002, at 1, available at http://svartifoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6513307688.
421
See supra text accompanying note 394.
422
See Biennial Review 2002, supra note 4.
423
See supra Part I.B.4.
424
See supra text accompanying notes 122–26.
425
See supra text accompanying notes 120–21121.
426
See supra text accompanying notes 122, 126.
427
See supra text accompanying notes 124–25.
420
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compete with Telemundo in that merger and then argue that
Univision competes with all the other English-language
broadcasters in America. Language changes the competitive
environment for media companies and the FCC cannot recognize
this in 2002, but ignore it in 2003.
2. Spanish-Language Community Programming Needs
To exclude language in the Univision merger was inconsistent
with prior FCC findings that sought to protect the needs of
Spanish-language audiences in other contexts.428 The FCC has
recognized community need and the public benefit of foreign
language media on numerous occasions.429 From the earliest days
of broadcasting, the FCC commended beneficial, foreign-language
broadcasting in America.430 The FCC has even demanded foreignlanguage broadcast service in communities that lack such an
outlet.431 In La Fiesta, it selected the broadcaster who would
provide a full-time Spanish-language radio service, not the one
would provide a part-time service.432 In the KEVT decision, the
Commission admitted that the Spanish-language nighttime radio
service was needed in that community and it was willing to waive
other rules to provide for the service.433
The FCC’s longtime “reluctance to define product markets
based on programming format or language”434 is not a valid policy
when it results in an abandonment of the regulatory responsibility
of protecting the public interest.435 The Supreme Court approved
the FCC’s use of the market to regulate entertainment formats,
however it cautioned a blanket application of such a rule.436 The
Supreme Court said that “the Commission should be alert to the
consequences of its policies and should stand ready to alter its rule

428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436

See supra Part I.B.1–5.
See supra Part I.B.1.
See supra text accompanying notes 68–69.
See supra text accompanying notes 80–81.
See supra text accompanying notes 72–81.
See supra text accompanying notes 102–03.
Univision License Transfer, supra note 129, ¶ 58, at *67.
See supra text accompanying notes 92–93.
See supra text accompanying notes 92–93.
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if necessary to serve the public interest more fully.”437
Notwithstanding the argument that Spanish-language media is
simply a format, the FCC still has the ability and duty to review
entertainment format changes to ensure the public interest is
served.438
More importantly, it cannot be argued that Spanish-language
broadcasting is a mere entertainment format when it acts as the
primary source of local news for Spanish-speakers.439 The
language of an audience affects information and resource choices
more than a musical preference. One can access local news
without having to listen to classical music or jazz. As Judge
Bazelon stated in the KEVT decision: “there is a crucial difference
between failure to serve a group which cannot understand the
language broadcasted, and a failure to reach a group which
chooses not to listen because of program content.”440 The FCC has
a duty to regulate in the public interest to protect audiences who
are not being served. The FCC has a record of protecting Spanishlanguage audiences who are not being served, but it abandoned this
audience when it approved the Univision merger.441
3. Network Representation Waiver—A Separate Policy for
Spanish-Language Broadcasters
The most controversial stance taken by the FCC in this debate
is its granting of the permanent waiver of the network
representation rule for only Spanish-language broadcasters, even
when a judge questioned this practice as anticompetitive and no
longer necessary in the public interest.442 If the waiver of the
network representation rule still operates based on the language of
the broadcasters, the FCC cannot pretend that the Univision merger
existed in a language-neutral marketplace. This waiver is evidence
of the already existing separate media marketplace of Spanishlanguage broadcasting. There is no question that language and
437
438
439
440
441
442

FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 603 (1981).
See supra text accompanying note 93.
See supra text accompanying notes 214, 224.
Tucson Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 452 F.2d 1380, 1383 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
See supra Part I.B.1.
See supra Part I.B.4.
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advertising competition are central to the FCC’s application of the
waiver.443 The FCC, in granting the network representation rule
waiver, acknowledged a fundamental difference in the business,
advertising, and structure of Spanish-language media as compared
to English-language media. These are competitive differences that
the FCC does not recognize for any other type of broadcaster. The
common thread amongst the waiver recipients is the language of
their broadcasts. It is inconsistent to recognize this language
distinction in such cases, but not in broadcast ownership decisions.
The waiver is no longer appropriate for Univision, because it
was originally issued to assist fledgling entities.444 In 2003,
Univision’s profits were $349 million and it no longer qualifies as
fledgling.445 Univision no longer needs the FCC to support its
development and growth in the same way it did in 1978. The
waiver was intended to “encourage[e] the growth and development
of new networks; foste[r] foreign-language programming;
increase[e] programming diversity; strengthe[n] competition
among stations; and foste[r] a competitive UHF service.”446
Certainly Univision can no longer argue that it is a new network.447
Univision, founded in 1961, is the fifth largest network putting it
ahead of UPN and the WB.448 Competition is not served by
extending the waiver privilege to Univision. Univision has been so
well-protected that the Administrative Law Judge’s premonition
about the anticompetitive effects of this waiver have come true.449
Univision argued in defense of the waiver that no other sales
representative competed with it and no competitor could take its
place if the waiver was lifted.450 In 1978, there actually was one

443

See supra text accompanying notes 136, 142, 156.
See supra text accompanying note 136.
445
Bill Carter, NBC Sees a Crown Jewel in a Spanish-TV Also-Ran, N.Y. TIMES, July
12, 2004, at C1.
446
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other sales representative competing with Univision 451 but now
Univision alone controls the market. Protected by this waiver,
Univision has successfully dominated the market in spot sales for
its own affiliates for over 25 years. Faced with this evidence of
anticompetitive harm, the FCC still did not withdraw the waiver.
This is a separate policy for Spanish-language broadcasters
that is not applied equally to other broadcasters. Yet it is a policy
that Univision seeks to protect, not for itself, but for Entravision,
the company it is a competitor of in radio, but an ally with in
television.452 Entravision, as owner of Univision affiliates, should
be free to make its own arguments for the benefits of the waiver.
The fact that Univision argued for the protection of the rule on
behalf of Entravision suggests that Entravision’s affiliate
independence is questionable. The rule was initially created to
prevent this kind of network control over affiliates.453 Univision
does not deserve this unique protection when it claims the
language of its broadcasts qualifies it for special privileges in one
area of business, but denies that language is a factor when used in a
definition for another of its ventures.
This record of FCC decisions demonstrates that language is,
and has always been, a factor in FCC decisions and must be taken
into consideration when media mergers affect foreign-language
audiences.
Language affects the market, advertising and
competition—all matters that are integral to the broadcast
ownership review.
B. Unique Use of Spanish-Language Media
The merger has given the FCC a significant record of studies,
statistics, and anecdotes of participants in the market of Spanishlanguage media that refutes the FCC’s conclusion that Spanishlanguage media functions in the same way as English-language
media.454 Spanish-language media cannot be substituted with
English-language media merely because Spanish-speaking
451
452
453
454

See supra text accompanying note 137.
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audiences “use” the content differently and because of presentation
style and focus.455 Since the broadcast ownership rules are
premised on serving and protecting consumers,456 the FCC must
address how Spanish-language consumers interact with their
media.
1. Viewpoint Diversity Cannot Include Cable
When one only speaks Spanish or prefers to hear local news in
Spanish, ones media choices are automatically limited and that
changes the dynamic of viewpoint diversity for a significant
portion of the population. The FCC has considered that many
different media outlets can contribute to viewpoint diversity
including broadcast television, radio, newspapers, cable and the
internet.457 The FCC, however, has said “Not all voices. . .speak
with the same volume.”458 Despite the fact that these sources of
viewpoint diversity add to the public’s choices,459 all these media
do not offer the same benefits to consumers460 nor are they
accessible to all people.461 Since local news programming is the
FCC’s indicator of viewpoint diversity,462 it has concluded that
each of these media cannot be considered of equal weight when
examining a local news service.463 Specifically, the FCC found
that cable cannot be a complete substitute for broadcast stations
and newspapers as sources of local news464 because one third of
Americans are not cable subscribers and only 30% of cable
subscribers “have access to local cable news channels.”465 Those
local cable channels only reach 10-15% of cable systems
nationwide and of the twenty-two local cable news channels
available, five serve the New York City area.466 The FCC decided
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466

See supra Part I.C.2.b.
Biennial Review 2002, supra note 4, ¶ 58, at 13639.
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 403 (3d Cir. 2004).
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that since cable still lacks significant local news options, it is not a
trustworthy measure of viewpoint diversity and excluded it from a
calculation of market diversity.467
In spite of the above facts, the FCC took the stance that a
merger of Univision and HBC would not harm market diversity468
because of the plethora of programming choices available through
cable and satellite sources for Spanish-language audiences.469 It is
well known, however, that cable subscriptions rates for Hispanic
households are lower than non-Hispanic households.470 The FCC
does not justify how cable overall cannot be a sufficient source of
viewpoint diversity, but it can be for Spanish-language audiences
who have less access to cable. The FCC rationalized their decision
by saying that there would be future cable options for the Hispanic
population, but such offerings do not yet exist. There is no
justification for the FCC’s argument that Spanish-language
audiences have enough viewing choices now based upon future,
hypothetical programming. The FCC cannot analyze competition
and diversity in a market today by counting theoretical
programming. The FCC also can’t rely on cable as a substitute for
free broadcasting when cable subscriptions are far less prevalent in
Hispanic households. FCC’s rationale to include cable in its
calculation of diversity for audiences affected by the Univision
merger lacks credibility under this analysis.
2. English-Language Programming Just Doesn’t Translate
The FCC relied on the availability of SAP to increase
programming choices for Spanish-language audiences in the
Univision decision.471 However, statistics have shown that only
42% of Hispanic households are cognizant of SAP’s existence and
only 1 in 6 of these households use it with any frequency.472 If no
one is using it, then it can’t be a substitute for Spanish-language
broadcasting, nor a measure for diversity in the Spanish-language
467
468
469
470
471
472
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market. More importantly, SAP only provides access to translated
English-language programming, and studies have shown that those
translations are not the same thing as programming designed for
Spanish-language audiences.473 This is especially critical when
looking at local news.474 If local news is the barometer of a
diverse and competitive media market, and translations of Englishlanguage news into Spanish have proved to be unworthy and
unwatched,475 then the Spanish-language audiences are not being
served by these English-language broadcasters and cannot be
considered part of the marketplace of choices available to Spanish
audiences. Just translating English broadcasts into Spanish does
not make the news more accessible if the news itself is not
pertinent to the viewers. Hispanic audiences prefer Spanishlanguage news broadcasts.476 Those broadcasts reflect issues not
covered on English-language news.477 Even Univision itself says
cultural preferences for Spanish-language programming are the
reason behind Univision’s dominance in the Hispanic ratings.478
The FCC cannot include SAP, which marginally opens up Englishlanguage programming to Spanish-language audiences, as a
guarantor of market diversity. The FCC improperly included cable
and SAP in the market definition used in the Univision merger and
in doing so counted improper programming as evidence of
diversity and competition in the affected market.
3. Advertising Marketplace Differences
The FCC heard from a number of market participants that the
advertising market for Spanish-language media revolves around
language and not media formats. Ad buyers will move from
Spanish-language television to Spanish-language radio based on
price changes, but will not move from Spanish to English or
English to Spanish in any media.479 Even the DOJ, which only
analyzed how the merger would lessen market competition,
473
474
475
476
477
478
479

See supra text accompanying notes 215–16, 223–24.
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defined the market in Univision as Spanish-language radio
advertising.480 Language was a critical factor used to assess the
actual behavior of advertisers in the market and to analyze the
potential harm for the market. The DOJ found that advertisers did
not consider Spanish-language radio to be a “reasonable substitute”
for non-Spanish-language radio.481 The DOJ recognized that
language is the linchpin between media advertising habits and
actual market competition and it is an erroneous decision for the
FCC to find differently.
4. Univision is the Market Leader—Now and Always
Univision admits “that there is no company as dominant in
English-language media as Univision is in Spanish.”482 No other
competitor even approaches the market position that Univision
held before the merger and certainly not after the merger.483 The
FCC was not troubled by this fact. It allowed this clear market
leader to grow and did not apply any limiting conditions to the
merger. The market was initially concentrated and this merger
only caused this market to further shrink. In the top ten Hispanic
markets, there are on “average 3.3 television stations, 5.7 AM
stations and 6 FM stations.”484 “There is no daily Spanishlanguage newspaper in fourteen of the top twenty Spanishlanguage markets.”485 These limited options were what the FCC
said constituted a diverse and competitive market for Spanishlanguage audiences. The FCC did not concern itself with the loss
of a voice from this market, because the FCC refused to even view
it as a market.486
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The Commission argued that the market was not dangerously
concentrated because radio market entry was easy. It cited as
evidence the number of stations which went from English
broadcasting to Spanish.487 It failed to note, however, that
Spanish-language incumbent broadcasters conducted most of those
conversions and488 new entrants were not involved.489 Thus, this
concentrated market remains so following the merger.
C. The Univision Decision Must Be Challenged
The Univision decision cannot be allowed to rest quietly in the
annals of FCC history. It should be challenged so that this
situation does not happen again. Even though the lawsuit raised by
NHPI to the D.C. Circuit failed for standing,490 the decision should
be disputed. Consolidation in Spanish-language media is already
significant and the next merger that seeks FCC approval could be
the death-knell for a truly diverse and competitive media market if
the FCC continues to ignore the question of how language affects
competition and diversity. Spanish-language media is only the first
stage of this fight.
As local foreign-language communities flock to more foreignlanguage programming, these issues will continue to arise.491 As
foreign-language communities grow, Congress will have to take
notice.492 The FCC should anticipate that these issues are not
487
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fleeting and will likely occur with increasing frequency as foreignlanguage media in America matures with its audiences.
D. Broadcast Ownership Rules Must Take Language into
Consideration
The FCC should use the filings made to the Commission on the
Univision merger to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and
directly address the question of whether Spanish-language media
should be regulated as a distinct media market. Spanish-language
media today is concentrated in a few companies, further
consolidated by the Univision merger. Media consolidation is not
the goal of the broadcast ownership rules. Media regulation is
supposed to maintain a diverse and competitive media
environment.493 The FCC has failed to do so for Spanish-language
media.
The next quadrennial review would be the perfect vehicle for
this endeavor. The 2002 biennial review has been remanded to the
FCC and the reasoning the FCC used to design the new rules and
approve the Univision merger needs serious repair.494 It would
make the most sense to develop a study of Spanish-language media
in tandem with the broadcast ownership structure and rules so that
competition, localism and diversity are truly protected for all
audiences.
This change in the market definition of broadcast ownership
rules would not result in dominant English-language companies
asserting their influence on two levels, by purchasing both
broadcast properties in English-language media and Spanishlanguage media. New rules should be promulgated so that the
FCC looks to Spanish-language concentration on the local level
and at the same time maintains a national cap on audience reach
that would include both Spanish and English-language media. The
rule should promote truly new entrants in the market and not
encourage a company at the outer limits of ownership in the
Hill Republicans have been flocking to Spanish-language classes and learning phrases
such as “Necesito su vota” (“I need your vote”)).
493
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494
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English-language market to expand into Spanish-language media.
The Commission should set a diversity and concentration value for
Spanish-language stations when the broadcaster has Englishlanguage holdings, and when the broadcaster only has Spanishlanguage stations. The goal of these new rules should be to protect
Spanish-language audiences against media consolidation in
Spanish outlets. Within these rules however, English-language
media giants should not be permitted to skirt overall ownership
limits and grow bigger with Spanish-language holdings.
The new rules should allow companies with culturally relevant
programming in the Spanish-language market to develop a
business on par with English-language companies, even with the
application of a market definition based on language. But these
companies must realize that media consolidation is not the
exclusive domain of the English-language market. If a company
chooses to enter the Spanish-language market, its ownership
control must be monitored so that the public interest benefits that
run to its Spanish-speaking consumers can be determined.
CONCLUSION
The FCC should revise its media ownership rules to allow for
language as an element of its formula to assess competition,
localism and diversity in the public interest. The Commission has
a duty and an obligation to all Americans to act in the public
interest when regulating the broadcast spectrum. Spanish speakers
deserve equal treatment and consideration from a Commission that
congratulates itself on its noble goals of competition, localism and
diversity. These goals should apply equally to all.

